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ABSTRACT
My dissertation empirically studies firms’ strategic behavior in the retail food
industry, focusing on the value of desirable locations. In Chapter 2, I study the effect
of in-store promotion strategies on consumer demand in the ready-to-serve wet soup
category in supermarkets. By building a flexible consumer demand model, I analyze
the effect of in-store promotions on price elasticity. Using the information on the in-
store promotions in a scanner dataset, I find that in-store displays make consumers
less sensitive to price changes while store flyers and price tags make consumer demand
more elastic to price changes. This result implies that in-store displays benefit smaller
manufacturers relatively more, leading to a less concentrated product market. In
Chapter 3, I investigate promotional allowances in order to study the value of in-store
displays in the supermarket industry. Building upon the consumer demand model
in Chapter 2, I build a structural model of profit maximization by both retailers
and manufacturers. I find that the manufacturers in the ready-to-serve wet soup
category provide retailers with monetary incentives in exchange for in-store promotion
opportunities. On average, in-store displays cost roughly 8 cents per product to
manufacturers. I also find that promotional allowance practices make in-store displays
v
unaffordable to smaller manufacturers. As a counterfactual analysis, I study the effect
of banning promotional allowances in a representative market and provide important
implications for antitrust issues. In Chapter 4, I study the ownership allocation
problem in the franchising industry. Specifically, I empirically investigate multi-unit
franchising in a fast food franchise. Multi-unit franchising, owning several units of the
same chain, has been prevalent in the fast food industry. In this chapter, I present the
ownership allocation pattern by utilizing a large dataset with ownership information
on businesses in the state of Texas. By focusing on a company without any company-
owned units, I find that not only economies of scale but also economies of density in
the unit network are important in understanding franchising ownership allocation.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
My dissertation studies how firms make important decisions and the impact of those
decisions on market outcomes, focusing on the value of desirable location. In particu-
lar, I am interested in firms strategic behaviors in the retail food industry. In the first
two chapters, I study the value of convenient product locations in supermarkets and
their effect on retail prices and market concentration. In the third chapter, I exam-
ine how geographic locations of franchisees’ existing unit network affect franchisors’
ownership decisions.
In Chapter 2 and 31, I study the value of in-store promotion contracts and the
impact on market outcomes in the supermarket industry. In-store promotions are a
particular type of advertising that takes place in retail sectors. As product manu-
facturers in some industries can reach consumers only through retailers, the impact
of product manufacturers becomes more complicated due to interactions with the
retailer sector. By exploiting the variation in promotions and decision timings, I esti-
mate the effect of in-store display on consumer demand and the relevant contract term
of in-store promotions in the ready-to-serve wet soup industry. I find that convenient
location of products makes demand less elastic and there exist monetary incentives
provided by manufacturers to retailers over in-store promotions. Furthermore, ad-
vertising opportunities may be allocated to other manufacturers than those with the
1I would like to thank Information Resources Inc. for making the data available. All estimates
and analysis in this paper, based on data provided by Information Resources Inc., are by the author
and not by Information Resources Inc.
2biggest potential gains due to the presence of vertical contracts. Though smaller man-
ufacturers benefit relatively more from advertising by changing consumer behaviors,
supply chain interactions also affect the manufacturers’ advertising decisions. These
chapters find if the supply chain interactions over promotions are considered, in-store
displays lead to lower retail prices of advertised products and more concentrated
product market, which cannot be explained solely by consumer demand.
In Chapter 4, I work on geographic economies of density in retail food franchises.
In the franchising industry, multi-unit ownership has become a mode of operation and
growth. While multi-unit franchisees have advantages such as experiences, single-unit
franchisees are able to monitor each unit more closely. I examine the role of scale
economies and density economies when a franchisor allocates new unit ownership.
Focusing on a food franchise company in the state of Texas, I use the information
on the ownership identity of each unit to track how each franchisee grows over time.
By focusing on a particular fast food franchise with no company unit, I study the
franchisors ownership allocation decisions from 1977 to 2016. In a multinomial logit
model, I examine how franchisees characteristics affect the franchisors decision. Most
importantly, I find that the franchisor prefers a franchisee with a medium-size network
that is close to the new unit.
3Chapter 2
The Effect of In-store Promotions on
Consumer Demand in the Supermarket
Industry
2.1 Introduction
Consumers face different types of in-store promotion every day. However, it is not
easy to predict the effect of in-store promotions on market structure. One of the
most studied questions in advertising is whether advertising increases market concen-
tration. There are two opposite theoretical views to answer this question. On the
one hand, product advertising increases market concentration by big brands’ creating
brand loyalty. On the other hand, product advertising provides more information
and reduces market friction. Therefore, the market will be more competitive with
advertising. This chapter estimates consumer demand in order to study the question
in a similar, but still different setting, i.e., in-store display.
Although in-store promotion strategies share a similar goal with traditional ad-
vertising, those strategies differ in many aspects. First, in-store marketing generally
does not generate a long-term effect. Traditional advertising creates and maintains
brand loyalty by creating a brand image. However, in-store display mostly intends
to urge immediate purchase decisions. Second, in-store advertising does not benefit
from economies of scale compared to traditional advertising. Advertising is one of the
most important factors when it comes to economies of scale. Compared to gain from
4advertising as a whole brand, gains from in-store promotions are more straightforward
and specific to the product. Lastly, there is a competition among different manufac-
turers due to limited resources. While manufacturers can advertise their product as
much as they want using other media, there is a limited space and other resources to
promote certain categories at the store.1 These differences make the old question in
the literature worth another attention.
I focus on in-store special displays among different types of in-store promotion
strategies. Retailers may use special price tags to advertise low prices of certain
products or include certain products in weekly store flyers. In addition, there are
“prime” locations such as candy rack near cashiers and end-of-aisle shelves. These
locations draw much attention from consumers and boost sales. These displays are
strategically designed throughout the store so that consumers cannot miss them dur-
ing the shopping trip.
As estimation results, I find that different in-store promotion strategies have dif-
ferent effects on consumer demand. First, I find that all three in-store promotion
strategies I study in this chapter, in-store special displays, special price tags, and
store flyer coverage, have positive impacts on consumer demand. Second, I find
that in-store special displays make consumer demand less sensitive to price changes
while other two promotional activities make consumer demand more elastic to price
changes. This result is consistent with the fact that retailers use special price tags
and store flyers for consumers to be more aware of low prices of certain products.2 By
using a flexible demand model, I examine both direct and indirect effects of in-store
promotion strategies in supermarkets.
The main findings in this chapter contribute to the existing literature in three
main ways. First, this study explicitly examines in-store marketing as an extension
1For endogenously limited number of spaces, refer to [Marx and Shaffer, 2010].
2Another interpretation is that these two promotional activities are more targeted to consumers
who are more sensitive to price changes.
5of advertising literature. In-store promotional activities have been important topics
in marketing literature which mostly concerns about the effectiveness of marketing
strategies, hence the effect on sales and profit. In economics, the effect of advertising
on industry-wide outcome has been studied the most both in theory and empirics.
This chapter may serve as an interdisciplinary extension of two lines of literature.
Second, this analysis makes a good ground for another fruitful area of research. Based
on the demand estimation, I can extend to model supply side of in-store displays and
estimate the promotional allowance manufacturers pay to retailers in exchange for
the right to display their products at “prime” locations. Lastly, I can extend the
model to study similar practices in the retail industry. For example, tobacco display
at convenience stores was banned in the U.K. since 2012.3 Similarly, extensive in-
store marketing of soft drinks and other sugary food product is criticized for potential
cause of younger population obesity problem.
2.1.1 Related literature
In general, this chapter belongs to the vast literature of advertising in economics.
There are only a few studies that analyze the effect of advertising on consumer util-
ity. [Ackerberg, 2001] focuses on explaining how in-store promotions are different from
media advertising in nature. More recently, [Seiler, 2013], [Pires, 2016] and [Gentry,
2016] study the role of in-store promotion strategies, but they allow in-store promo-
tions to affect consumer utility in a more indirect way, only through consumer search
cost.
In the marketing literature, the effects of in-store promotions in supermarkets
have drawn consistent attention. For example, scholars have studied how in-store
promotions such as in-store special display affect the way people react to price cuts.
3The law prohibits any display of tobacco products or tobacco prices at larger stores since 2012,
and at smaller stores since 2015.
6Most papers in the marketing literature find that various in-store promotions are
strategic complements to price cuts. Regarding in-store special displays, however,
the evidences have been mixed. For example, [Lemon and Nowlis, 2002] establish
that high-quality products benefit more from in-store promotions when promoted
without price cuts. [Gupta, 1988] and [Papatla and Krishnamurthi, 1996] study inter-
actions among different marketing strategies. These studies find that some of in-store
promotions are strategic substitutes to price cuts.
Similarly, I study the effect of in-store promotions on consumer price elasticity,
focusing on in-store special displays. [Erdem et al., 2008] and [Chan et al., 2017] use
similar approach to study the impact of advertising on price elasticity. For example,
[Erdem et al., 2008] find that advertising makes consumer demand less elastic to
price changes in a specific category, where advertising focus more on differentiating
product characteristics. While those studies consider a limited set of products in their
analyses, this chapter uses not only big companies’ products but also small brands’
products in order to develop a supply side model and to provide some implications
for market concentration in chapter 3.
2.2 Industry Background
In this section, I will briefly describe various in-store promotions strategies in su-
permarkets I study and a specific product category in which I analyze the effect of
in-store promotions.
In-store promotions in supermarkets
In supermarkets, there are various in-store promotions to boost sales. First, super-
markets use regular store flyers, often called as weekly circulars, to advertise any
events or low prices at their stores. Retailers use flyers to compete with their rivals
and to draw consumers into their stores. Second, there are in-store special displays
7around the store. In-store displays are located at “prime” locations within the store.
In-store special displays include candy racks, small refrigerators near checkout desks
and end-of-aisle shelves. In holidays, there are more in-store displays such as a pile of
soft drinks or chocolate bunnies in big baskets. Third, special price tags are a com-
mon in-store promotion strategy. Price tags advertise the price reduction or just draw
consumer attention. There also exist relatively new in-store promotion strategies such
as product demonstration and screen advertising. Most in-store promotions vary by
the week at the store level. I study the effect of the first three in-store promotions
due to data availability.
Figure 2·1: All In-store Marketing in Ready-to-serve Wet Soup In-
dustry
Among the three types of in-store promotions I study, I emphasize in-store dis-
plays for two reasons. First, in-store displays affect consumers only while they are
physically at stores. Consumers do not observe in-store displays before they enter
the stores. Also, there is no specific reason to believe that the effect of in-store dis-
8plays lingers for a long time after consumers leave the store. Second, in-store displays
are limited in availability within a specific category in general. In-store displays are
naturally limited by space. Retailers have a limited number of products on display
each week. By studying in-store displays in a specific product category, I examine the
effect of in-store promotions with less concern about endogenously varying promotion
opportunities.4
Ready-to-serve wet soup category in supermarkets
I study in-store displays in the ready-to-serve wet soup category for the following
reasons. First, the soup product is simple. The products in the ready-to-serve wet
soup category are similar in characteristics. The soup category is also well-established
and well-known to consumers,which allows me to ignore the information effect of in-
store displays. Moreover, only a limited number of products are on special display
in this category. Last but not least, the ready-to-serve wet soup category consists
of product manufacturers with different price points and sizes: low-priced product
manufacturers with big market shares and high-priced product manufacturers with
small market shares.5
2.3 Data and Preliminaries
2.3.1 Data description
This paper uses the Information Resources Inc. (IRI) Academic dataset. The dataset
is the Universal Product Code (UPC) level6 scanner data for different categories of
products in 50 different IRI markets (which roughly correspond to the metropolitan
4I do not study endogenous choice of availability nor space allocation across different categories
in this paper.
5This is shown in Table 2.2.
6UPC is a barcode symbol that is a 12-digit numeric code for each trade item.
9area) in the U.S. from 2000 to 2012.7 I use the entire grocery store sample in 2008. The
dataset includes weekly average revenue, quantity sold and promotion information
for each UPC-level product. There is also a separate dataset that indicates brand
affiliation and some product characteristics.
I define a market with a store-week pair. In the dataset, each store has a unique
identification code and chain affiliation. I use the data at the store-level because the
variation in promotions occurs at the store level. According to industry knowledge,
different stores under the same chain system have different promotions at their dis-
cretion. I find that the actual data supports stores’ discretion in in-store promotions.
Whenever I use the term “retailer”, that means each store. I also use weekly vari-
ations because prices and promotions vary by week. Typically, retail prices do not
vary within the week.
I consider each product line as a different product and aggregate UPC-level infor-
mation to the product line level. For example, Campbell Chunky Soup and Campbell
Chunky Fully Loaded are two different products in my analysis while Campbell Chunky
Soup Steak and Potato and Campbell Chunky Soup Vegetable Beef are treated as the
same product. From now on, I will call each product line as a product.
Next, I explain how I construct some key variables in my analysis. Most impor-
tantly, I introduce variables describing in-store promotions. While I do not observe
the exact product locations, I have information about whether the product was on
special display. I use a dummy variable for in-store displays which takes a value of
one when the product was on display. Similarly, I use dummy variables for the other
two in-store promotions: price tags and store flyers. The other important variable
is the retail price. For retail prices, I use the average prices paid by consumers at
each week for each product. Since I do not have any information on coupon use, I
assume that each consumer paid the same amount for the same product and prices
7The detail of the dataset refers to [Bronnenberg et al., 2008].
10
stay constant within the same week.
I supplement the main dataset with demographic data and input cost data. De-
mographic data for each market is from the American Community Survey public mi-
crodata sample, which provides empirical distributions of variables such as income.
To collect input cost data, I gather information on manufacturing facilities from the
Reference USA database and other sources. I use the locations of facilities and the
store location information to find the closest manufacturing facility to each store.
The input costs include gas prices and commercial and industrial electricity prices
drawn from publications from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Table
2.1 summarizes the data I use.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs
Price 2.599 0.807 0.01 17.99 1,918,228
Display 0.039 0.193 0 1 1,918,228
Major Display 0.023 0.151 0 1 1,918,228
Price Tag 0.207 0.405 0 1 1,918,228
Flyer 0.049 0.216 0 1 1,918,228
Low-(Non-) fat 0.241 0.354 0 1 1,918,228
Saltiness 0.792 0.316 0 1 1,918,228
Additives 0.481 0.328 0 1 1,918,228
Number of UPCs 8.342 8.99 1 64 1,918,228
Minimum Distance 850.439 1,526.642 1.263 15,000 1,918,228
Gas Price 3.337 0.696 1.568 4.512 1,918,228
Energy Price 9.744 2.679 4.87 19.52 1,918,228
Source : IRI Academic Dataset, Reference USA and other sources
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Bureau of Labor Statistics
Gas Price : Unit(Dollars per Gallon),
Variation (Week-Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts)
Energy Price : Unit(Cents per Kilowatthour), Variation (Month-State)
2.3.2 Preliminary results
Product-Store-Week level variation in in-store special displays
In the ready-to-serve wet soup category, retailers specially display only a limited
number of products. Compared to the average number of available products, in-store
display in this category is rare. Figure 2·3 shows a sample of display patterns in
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Figure 2·2: Bar Chart for Sales and In-store Promotions
two different stores within the same chain in the Washington D.C. area. Each block
represents an observation in the data and is colored when the product was on special
display. The pattern supports the use of weekly variations in in-store displays. It
also shows that each store has some discretion in in-store promotion contracts. Even
within the same chain, in-store displays can look very different across stores. For
example, Amy’s had in-store displays throughout the year at the first store while
it did not at the second store in Figure 2·3. According to Table 2.2 and Figure 2·2,
Campbell’s products are frequently promoted with in-store promotion strategies, even
compared to their big market shares. Figure 2·4 is another example of this pattern
that big manufacturers (which include Campbell and General Mills) are prominently
displayed very frequently.
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Figure 2·4: Histogram of In-store Display Shares
In-store promotion strategy mixes
In this subsection, I show that different in-store promotion strategies are used together
at the same time. Following marketing literature on different marketing mix, I use
price cut and its interaction with other promotion strategies. I define a price cut as
having a price drop by more than 20% from the regular price.8 In Table 2.3, I show
that different in-store promotion strategies happen together. In the formal empirical
analysis, however, I do not consider price cuts as an in-store promotion. Rather, I
use retail prices in consumer demand model.
Table 2.3: Pairwise Correlation among Promotion strategies
Display Promotion Feature Price cuts
Display 1
Promotion 0.291∗∗∗ 1
Feature 0.304∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 1
Price cuts 0.258∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
8I use the model of prices within the calendar year as a regular price of a specific product.
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Postive effect of in-store promotions on sales
I provide some preliminary relationships between sales and in-store promotions. Table
2.4 presents the ordinary least square (OLS) regression results at product-store-week
level. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total unit sales of each product.
The results show that higher prices lead to lower sales and in-store promotions have
a positive impact on sales. As different in-store promotions are often used together,
controlling for other promotion strategies makes the coefficient on each promotion
strategy smaller in magnitude. The results are similar with brand dummies. Overall,
the results are consistent.
2.4 Model
I use a discrete choice model to model consumer demand. Consumer demand is
modeled by a discrete choice model as in [Berry, 1994], [Berry et al., 1995], and [Nevo,
2001]. Let Ar be the set of available products at store r. Each consumer chooses a
product to maximize his utility among all the products in Ar or an outside option in
store r at each week t. Consumer i’s indirect utility by choosing product j at store r
at week t is:
uijrt = αipjrt + αddisplayjrtpjrt + βddisplayjrt + βiXjrt + ξjrt + εijrt, (2.1)
where pjrt is the price of product j at store r at week t and displayjrt is a dummy
variable indicating whether product j is specially displayed at store r at week t, and
Xjrt are observable product characteristics (other than promotions) of product j. I
also include the other two promotion strategies in a similar fashion, but I do not
write them in expression (2.1) for the sake of readability. The fifth term, ξjrt is a
time-varying unobserved product characteristic and εijrt is a mean-zero stochastic
16
Table 2.4: The Effect of In-store Promotions on Sales
log(Total Unit)
Price -0.459∗∗∗ -0.357∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗
(0.00117) (0.00111) (0.00110) (0.00149)
Display 1.345∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗
(0.00493) (0.00468) (0.00474) (0.00455)
Low-(Non-) fat -0.0256∗∗∗ -0.0282∗∗∗ -0.0279∗∗∗ 0.0295∗∗∗
(0.00277) (0.00257) (0.00256) (0.00292)
Saltiness -0.147∗∗∗ -0.0908∗∗∗ -0.0716∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗
(0.00325) (0.00302) (0.00300) (0.00342)
Additives 0.397∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗
(0.00311) (0.00288) (0.00286) (0.00348)
Flavors 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0865∗∗∗ 0.0856∗∗∗ 0.0679∗∗∗
(0.000113) (0.000108) (0.000107) (0.000118)
Price tag 1.287∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 1.082∗∗∗
(0.00233) (0.00241) (0.00234)
Flyer 0.743∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗
(0.00436) (0.00419)
Constant 2.086∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗ 1.578∗∗∗ 1.037
(0.00508) (0.00478) (0.00476) (276.0)
Observations 1,918,228 1,918,228 1,918,228 1,918,228
Adjusted R2 0.481 0.553 0.559 0.596
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Every column includes quarter dummies to control for seasonal fluctuation.
The first three columns do not control for brand dummies, but the last column does.
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error term. I also define the outside option by not buying any soup product in the
category or buying a store-brand product. The mean utility from the outside option
cannot be separately identified, so I normalize it to 0 and assume that it remains
constant over time. Moreover, I include brand dummies to control for unobservable
brand-specific product characteristics. Therefore, I can interpret ξjrt as a market-
specific deviation from the mean unobserved characteristics of the brand (unobserved
by econometrician).
The random coefficients βi’s are consumer taste parameters for observed product
characteristics and αi is the marginal (dis)utility from the retail price. This will be
modeled as [
αi
βi
]
=
[
α
β
]
+ ΣDi + Γνi, νi ∼ Pν(ν), Di ∼ PˆD(D),
where the parameters α and β are the mean of the random coefficients, Di are in-
dividual random draws from empirical distributions PˆD(D) of observed demographic
characteristics, and νi are individual random draws from Pν(ν) to capture unob-
served random shocks. Therefore, Σ captures the deviation from the mean due to
demographic characteristics and Γ captures the deviation due to random shocks. I
assume that νi are normally distributed and Di follow the empirical distribution from
the demographic data. If I assume that εijrt are distributed according to Type I
extreme value distribution, then the market share of product j at store r at week t is
sjrt =
∫ ∫
exp(vijrt)
1 +
∑
k∈Ar exp(vikrt)
dPˆD(D)dPν(ν) (2.2)
where vijrt = αipjrt + αddisplayjrtpjrt + βddisplayjrt + βiXjrt + ξjrt.
To compare, I also use different specifications including a simple logit model. By
using a more flexible model, the random coefficient model can achieve more realistic
substitution pattern with the cost of more complicated computation.
It is worth mentioning that in-store promotions have two different effects on con-
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sumer utility in the model. First, βd is the direct utility from in-store displays. If the
βd is negative in sign, consumers consider in-store displays as nuisances. Otherwise,
consumers enjoy in-store displays. Second, I include the interaction term of in-store
promotions with the retail price to capture the indirect effect of in-store promotional
activity on price elasticity. If αd is negative in sign, the displays make consumers more
sensitive to price changes. In such cases, in-store displays and price cuts are strategic
complements. Otherwise, displays make consumers less price sensitive. As in [Becker
and Murphy, 1993], I interpret the first effect as a shift of the entire demand curve
while the second effect changes the slope of the demand curve.
2.5 Estimation
The most important variables of interest are a dummy variable for special displays
and its interaction term with prices. I also use other promotional information, such
as price tags and flyers (and their interaction terms with price) in the same fashion.
Other product characteristics include dummy variables indicating whether the prod-
uct is low-fat (or non-fat) and whether the product has some additives. I control
for the number of different flavors and the percentage of sodium compared to regular
canned soup products. I also include the number of available products in the market
following [Ackerberg and Rysman, 2005]. Moreover, I use brand dummies and quar-
ter dummies as controls. I have explored different specifications, and the results are
robust. The estimation includes random coefficients on constant, price, non-fat and
saltiness. I also include observed heterogeneity in marginal (dis)utility from prices
due to income level.
Given product characteristics, retailers choose the retail prices to maximize their
profit after demand shocks are realized. When retailers set their retail prices, they
consider both observed and unobserved product characteristics. For example, retail-
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ers may set higher prices for products with national advertising going on even when
advertising information is not observable to econometricians. To address the endo-
geneity issue with prices, I use cost-based instruments in addition to all the observed
product characteristics. I assume that input costs are not correlated with unobserved
demand determinants ξjrt, which is reasonable. The cost-based instruments include
the distance between retail store location and location of the closest manufacturing
facility (or distribution center) of the product. I calculate the distance with the
geocoded location of the center of the city where grocery stores locate and the clos-
est manufacturing facility. I also use average gas prices between store location and
facility location. Similarly, I include commercial energy prices of the state where the
store is located and industrial energy prices of the state where the closest facility
is. Quarterly dummies are also used to control for unobserved demand determinants
varying quarterly.
Another potential endogeneity arises as one can imagine that in-store promotions
change with other unobserved product characteristics. For example, ready-to-serve
soup products are specially displayed because the weather is unexpectedly cold at
certain weeks. According to the interviews with industry insiders, I establish that
in-store promotions are mostly determined far in advance for the next calendar year
when manufacturers and retailers determine the product availability for the next year.
This fact supports that in-store promotions are not affected by unobserved demand
shocks each week.
Parameters are estimated by matching the predicted market shares in the model
(expressed in (2.2)) and observed market shares in the data. As the first step, I need
observed market shares of each product in the data. Unfortunately, I do not observe
the actual market size for each store. A scanner data collects the information on the
purchases made but does not collect the total number of consumers who visited the
20
store. Thus, I use a proxy to capture the total number of consumers visiting the
store each week. I fix the market size for each store that increases with the median
soup sales over the year.9 In this way, I can capture different sizes of store sales and
capture some of the differences in soup sales. In this approach, I assume that the
total number of consumer visits remains constant throughout the year.10
2.6 Results
In Table 2.5, I present the estimates for the taste parameters from a simple logit
model. To allow for more flexible substitution pattern, I estimate the random co-
efficient model. Table 2.6 presents the estimates of demand parameters from the
random coefficient model. The price coefficient is underestimated when I do not take
into account the heterogeneity in consumer taste.
In general, the estimates for coefficients on product characteristics have the ex-
pected signs and are statistically significant. Consumers prefer lower prices, non-fat
(low-fat) products, and products with additives. The estimated coefficient on the
number of flavors shows that consumers prefer more flavor options. The result also
implies that there is crowding in unobserved product characteristic space.( [Ackerberg
and Rysman, 2005])
Direct and indirect effect of in-store promotions
There are two different effects of in-store promotions in the demand model. First,
in-store promotions provide extra utility to consumers. As a direct effect of in-store
promotions, the coefficients on the dummy variables for in-store promotions are pos-
9To be exact, three hundred times the median number of total (ready-to-serve wet) soup sales.
10Alternatively, I use the total sales in the soup category. I use only specific products, ready-to-
serve wet soups, in broad soup category in my analysis. The data in 2008 has different types of
soups such as dry soups, condensed soups and ready-to-serve wet soups in the soup category. I can
use the other types of soups as the outside option. With this measure of market size, the results
remain consistent except some changes in interpretation of quarter dummies.
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Table 2.5: Demand Estimation : Simple Logit Model Results
OLS IV
Price -0.265∗∗∗ -0.638∗∗∗
(0.00159) (0.0416)
Display × Price -0.0283∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.00707) (0.0317)
Price tag × Price -0.317∗∗∗ -0.0242
(0.00366) (0.0268)
Flyer × Price -0.273∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗
(0.00793) (0.0690)
Display 0.654∗∗∗ 0.177∗
(0.0159) (0.0697)
Price tag 1.718∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗
(0.00895) (0.0666)
Flyer 1.193∗∗∗ 1.583∗∗∗
(0.0169) (0.141)
Low-(Non-) fat 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗
(0.00294) (0.00314)
Saltiness 0.389∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗
(0.00345) (0.00651)
Additives 0.920∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗
(0.00352) (0.0178)
Flavors 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0641∗∗∗
(0.000119) (0.000155)
Number of Soups available -0.0501∗∗∗ -0.0504∗∗∗
(0.000127) (0.000136)
Constant -9.833 -10.57∗∗∗
(278.4) (0.139)
Observations 1,918,228 1,918,228
Adjusted R2 0.620 0.609
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Every column includes quarter dummies and brand dummies.
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Table 2.6: Demand Estimation : Random Coefficient Model Results
Coef std.dev
Price -8.826 0.006
(2.164) (0.704)
Display × Price 0.203
(0.04)
Price tag × Price -0.105
(0.038)
Flyer × Price -0.468
(0.075)
Display 0.171
(0.086)
Price tag 1.209
(0.101)
Flyer 1.652
(0.154)
Low-(Non-) fat -0.039 0.524
(0.598) (1.189)
Saltiness -0.278 -1.174
(1.15) (1.072)
Additives 0.924
(0.04)
Flavors 0.067
(0.003)
Number of Soups available -0.0498
(0.001)
Constant -9.904 0.306
(0.457) (0.931)
Observations 1,918,228 1,918,228
Standard errors in parentheses
The estimation includes quarter dummies and brand dummies.
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itive and significant. That means consumers value the in-store promotions by them-
selves. There is also an indirect effect of in-store promotions on price elasticity. The
interaction terms between in-store promotions and prices capture this indirect effect.
It is interesting to see that the indirect effects differ across different promotion strate-
gies. As the estimated coefficients on interaction terms with price tag and flyer are
negative, we can say that these promotional activities make consumers more price-
sensitive. However, the interaction term with display has a positive coefficient, which
implies that consumers are less price sensitive when products are specially displayed.
This result implies that price cuts and in-store displays are strategic substitutes to
each other. In Figure 2·5, I show that the direct effect shifts out the entire demand
curve and the demand curve becomes steeper. Based on the price coefficient, -8.826,
the median price elasticity of own-price increase is -4.02.
Figure 2·5: Demand Curve by Display Status : Campbell Chunky
Example
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Figure 2·6: Demand Curve by Price Tag Status : Campbell Chunky
Example
Figure 2·7: Demand Curve by Store Flyer Status : Campbell Chunky
Example
Comparing different in-store promotion strategies
Although all three in-store promotion strategies I consider have positive direct effects,
those strategies have different indirect effects. As direct effects, all three in-store
25
promotions, in-store displays, price tags, and store flyers, increase consumer utility.
To interpret this in a graph, the entire demand curve shifts out with the in-store
promotion strategies. In contrast, the indirect effects are different across different
promotion strategies. While price tags and store flyers make consumers more sensitive
to price changes, in-store displays make consumer demand less elastic. Consumers
may feel less sensitive to an increase in prices when the products are conveniently
located at the store. Another possible interpretation is that in-store special displays
make it hard for consumers to compare prices of different products, which leads to
less elastic demand. However, price tags and store flyers make consumers more aware
of the products’ retail prices. In Figure 2·6 and Figure 2·7, I show that the direct
effect shifts out the entire demand curve and the demand curves become less steep
because of the indirect effect on price elasticity. By comparing sample demand curves
with and without promotions, I find that the indirect effects differ across different
in-store promotion strategies. Figure 2·5 shows that the benefit of in-store displays is
relatively greater for high priced products. The benefits of price tags and store flyers
are greater for low priced products.
Consumers’ value of in-store promotions
I provide a dollar value interpretation for in-store promotions. I compare the marginal
utility of in-store promotion with the marginal disutility of price. The exact expression
I use is
∆u
∆display
∆u
∆p
=
βd + αdp
α + αd
.
For in-store displays, the consumers’ value can be translated to 6 cents at the
average price of displayed products. I interpret this value as meaning that consumers
are willing to pay 6 cents more for products to be specially displayed without any
price change. Similarly, I find that the consumers’ value of price tags and store flyers
26
are 10 cents and 7 cents respectively. If I do not take into account the indirect effect
on price elasticity, consumers’ value of displays would be only 1 cent. Consumers
value of price tags and store flyers are 14 cents and 18 cents, respectively without
considering the indirect effects.
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Chapter 3
Vertical Contracts over In-store
Promotions in the Supermarket Industry
3.1 Introduction
Product manufacturers employ different strategies to influence consumers’ behaviors
and earn more profit. In many industries, however, manufacturers can reach con-
sumers only through retail sectors. Retailers have different interests than those of
manufacturers. Due to this conflict of interest in the supply chain, it is not sufficient
to consider only the consumer side of the market to study the effect of manufacturers’
strategies on market outcomes. In this chapter, I study the impact of in-store promo-
tions, a specific type of advertising that takes places in the retail sector, on product
market outcomes while incorporating supply chain interactions as well as consumer
demand.
In several industries, especially where manufacturers sell their products mostly
through the retail sector, there is a trend toward in-store promotions. In-store promo-
tions are marketing strategies taking place in the retail sector when consumers make
purchases. Examples along this line include consumer-packaged goods promotions in
supermarkets, advertising at online shopping websites, and promotional speaking of
doctors and pharmacists about drugs. Due to limited resources for in-store promo-
tions, product manufacturers compete for access to this type of advertising. Retailers
implement different ways to allocate their resources, and these often involve monetary
28
incentives provided by product manufacturers. These incentives directly affect retail-
ers’ pricing strategies, so that we can infer monetary incentives from retail prices.
Therefore, in-store promotion contracts are a unique setting to study the vertical
relationship between retailers and manufacturers when exact contract terms are not
available to researchers.
By studying in-store promotions in supermarkets, this chapter revisits an old
question and provides a new perspective. In particular, I analyze the effect of in-
store promotion contracts on retail prices and market concentration by disentangling
the demand and supply side effects of the product market. This chapter finds that
supply chain interactions over in-store promotions may lead to lower retail prices of
the promoted products even when demand estimation results predict higher optimal
prices for those products. Furthermore, in-store promotion opportunities may be
allocated to other manufacturers than those with the largest potential gains due
to conflicts of interest in the supply chain. Even while small manufacturers gain
relatively more from a certain type of in-store promotions, retailers gain from the
vertical contracts with big manufacturers and promote their products.
To disentangle the effect of vertical contracts over in-store promotions separately,
I model wholesale price discount/premium contracts as contracts over in-store promo-
tions based on consumer demand model in Section 2.4. In other words, manufacturers
sell their products to a retailer with discounted wholesale prices if the products are
on displays, price tags or store flyers. Thus, retailers face wholesale prices varying
according to promotion status on top of constant wholesale prices for each product. I
decompose the wholesale prices into two different parts and estimate them separately,
base wholesale prices and wholesale price discount/premium varying with promotion
status. This approach is consistent with industry practice and allows us to quantify
the relevant contract terms without additional assumption.
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This chapter quantifies relevant contract terms between firms and analyzes the
effect of in-store promotion contracts on market outcomes. I find that there exist
wholesale price discounts for promotional support by retailers. On average, retailers
face lower wholesale prices for products with special displays, price tags, and flyers
by 8 cents, 23 cents, and 20 cents, respectively. This chapter argues that without
considering the supply side of the market, we may not be able to explain the actual
realization of in-store promotions and their impact on market outcomes. Consumers
often find products of big manufacturers in promotional spaces. It is also more likely
that displayed products have low prices. These cannot be explained only by the con-
sumer demand results above. From supply estimation, I find that there are monetary
incentives tied to in-store promotions provided by product manufacturers, which re-
sults in lower retail prices of advertised products. Moreover, the relative benefits to
smaller manufacturers from in-store displays may disappear due to the presence of
wholesale price discount contracts. Smaller manufacturers tend to have lower mar-
gins, and they can find it unprofitable to bid for in-store displays, which leads to
biased participation decisions and higher concentration in the product market.
3.1.1 Related literature
This chapter is related to the literature of advertising in economics. In-store promo-
tion strategies belong to advertising, which is an example of endogenous sunk cost
defined by [Sutton, 1991]. [Sutton, 1991] develops a game theoretic model to provide
predictions on the relationship between market size and concentration. The author
finds that the negative relationship between market size and concentration breaks
down in endogenous sunk cost industries. Later, papers such as [Bronnenberg et al.,
2011] provide empirical evidences of predictions of [Sutton, 1991]. This chapter also
deals with market concentration in the presence of in-store promotions as an example
of endogenous sunk cost.
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This chapter contributes to the literature on vertical relationships. Broadly, [Mor-
timer, 2008], [Ho, 2009] and [Asker, 2016] study the vertical contracts. Specifically,
there are papers that study the vertical relationship between retailers and manu-
facturers in supermarkets. For example, [Sudhir, 2001] and [Villas-Boas and Zhao,
2005] model the relationship with a linear pricing model. [Berto Villas-Boas, 2007]
and [Bonnet and Dubois, 2010] depart from a linear pricing model and study different
models of vertical relationship. In this chapter, I extend the literature by modeling
in-store promotion contracts as a part of vertical contracts between retailers and
product manufacturers. Even though some papers study in-store promotions, few of
them models supply chain interactions between manufacturers and retailers. [Tenn
et al., 2010] and [Tenn, 2006] study in-store promotions as firms’ endogenous choices,
but treat them as product manufacturers’ decisions without any role of retailers.
The chapter also contributes to the literature by studying firms’ pricing and other
types of in-store promotions together. In the marketing literature, in-store promotions
and retail pricing have mostly been analyzed separately. Some papers analyzing both
pricing and in-store promotions together tend to consider retail pricing as a special
type of in-store promotions and study different marketing mixes in 2.1.1. However, it
is important to note that pricing and promotion decisions are often made by differ-
ent departments in the same retailer or even made by different layers in the supply
chain. While promotion decisions are made by contracts between manufacturers and
retailers, retail prices are mostly decided by retailers’ pricing department. This chap-
ter explicitly models those decisions by different parties and analyzes their vertical
interactions.
In addition, this chapter builds on the literature on retailing contracts. In partic-
ular, this chapter contributes to the literature on vendor allowance. Vendor allowance
is the payment from manufacturers to retailers in exchange for all the distributional
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support. For example, [Marx and Shaffer, 2010] and [Klein and Wright, 2007] in-
vestigate the antitrust effects of slotting allowance, a type of vendor allowances for
product availability. [Hristakeva, 2018] and [Israilevich, 2004] empirically study the
impact of slotting allowances on the product assortment in the supermarket industry.
In this chapter, I model the vertical contract over in-store promotions in a tractable
way and quantify the magnitude of monetary incentives provided by manufacturers,
often called promotional allowances.
3.2 Industry Background
Timing over in-store promotion contracts in supermarkets
Based on the industry background described in Section 2.2, I explain the in-store
promotion contracts in supermarkets. Once manufacturers and retailers decide the
assortment for the next calendar year, the retailers offer a menu of different in-store
promotions available for the year.1 There is a limited number of products featuring
in in-store flyers or locating at “prime” locations at each week. If manufacturers
decide to participate in in-store promotions, they write a contract with the retailer.
According to interviews with industry insiders, in-store promotion contracts between
firms are very complex. Manufacturers provide retailers with monetary benefits in
exchange for promotional support. Contracts may assign the location of in-store
displays in advance. Given the agreement between two parties, manufacturers make
the payments to retailers, often called promotional allowances. Figure 3·1 describes
sequences of the contracts over in-store promotions.
1That is why these are called “calendar marketing agreements” in some categories.
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Figure 3·1: Sequences of In-store Promotion Contracts
In-store promotion contracts: Promotional allowance
The main focus of this chapter is to quantify the magnitude of a special type of vendor
allowance, promotional allowance in the retail industry and analyze its impact on
market concentration and retail prices. Before I start any empirical analysis, I briefly
explain promotional allowance practice and its importance in the consumer packaged
goods industry.
There has been a trend from advertising spending toward trade promotions in
many consumer packaged goods (CPG) categories. Promotional allowances are mon-
etary incentives provided by manufacturers to retailers in exchange for all the pro-
motional support by retailers. As I stated earlier, in-store promotions are mostly
decided by contracts between manufacturers and retailers and these contracts involve
some monetary benefit from manufacturers to retailers.2 The contracts are complex
and monetary transfers take different formats. While some contracts involve simple
wholesale price discounts, others are nonlinear contracts.
2I present some suggestive evidences for the the monetary incentives in the promotion contracts
in 3.3.2.
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In this chapter, I study the promotional allowance based on the demand estima-
tion in the previous chapter. I assume that the contracts over in-store promotions are
linear in the empirical analysis due to the limited information and complexity of the
contracts. There are two main reasons that I take a linear approach in modelling the
supply side. First, manufacturering firms consider those promotional allowances as
reduction of revenue in their annual reports. For example, according to the Campbell
Soup Company Annual Report of 2010, the company offered “various sales incen-
tive programs to customers (retailers) .. such as .. feature price discounts, in-store
display incentives, .., which are classified as a reduction of revenue.” (p.29) That
is, manufacturers consider promotional allowances as either lower wholesale prices.
In this chapter, I assume that the two parties write contracts over wholesale prices.
Second, an alternative nonlinear contract mostly used in the previous literature is
not consistent with common practice in reality. In the literature, scholars have as-
sumed that nonlinear contracts between manufacturers and retailers compose of two
different parts, lump-sum transfer from manufacturers and franchise fees by retail-
ers. According to interviews with industry insiders, I find out that it is manufacturer
that provides any monetary incentives in exchange for in-store promotions. Over-
all, a simple linear contract between two parties can be a good benchmark to model
promotional allowance practices.
3.3 Data and Preliminaries
3.3.1 Data description
This chapter uses the Information Resources Inc.(IRI) Academic dataset. The dataset
is the Universal Product Code (UPC) level3 scanner data for different categories of
products in 50 different IRI markets (which roughly correspond to the metropolitan
3UPC is a barcode symbol that is a 12-digit numeric code for each trade item.
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area) in the U.S. from 2000 to 2012.4 I use the entire grocery store sample including
all the brands in the market with matching product information. The dataset includes
weekly average revenue, quantity sold and promotion information for each UPC-level
product. There is also a separate dataset that indicates brand affiliation and some
product characteristics.
I define a market with a store-week pair. In the dataset, each store has a unique
identification code and chain affiliation. I use the data at the store-level because the
variation in promotions occurs at the store level. According to industry knowledge,
different stores under the same chain system have different promotions at their dis-
cretion. I find that the actual data supports stores’ discretion in in-store promotions.
Whenever I use the term “retailer”, that means each store. I also use weekly vari-
ations because prices and promotions vary by week. Typically, retail prices do not
vary within the week.
I consider each product line as a different product and aggregate UPC-level infor-
mation to the product line level. For example, Campbell Chunky Soup and Campbell
Chunky Fully Loaded are two different products in my analysis while Campbell Chunky
Soup Steak and Potato and Campbell Chunky Soup Vegetable Beef are treated as the
same product. From now on, I will call each product line as a product.
Next, I explain how I construct some key variables in my analysis. Most impor-
tantly, I introduce variables describing in-store promotions. While I do not observe
the exact product locations, I have information about whether the product was on
special display. I use a dummy variable for in-store displays which takes a value of
one when the product was on display. Similarly, I use dummy variables for the other
two in-store promotions: price tags and store flyers. The other important variable
is the retail price. For retail prices, I use the average prices paid by consumers at
each week for each product. Since I do not have any information on coupon use, I as-
4The detail of the dataset refers to [Bronnenberg et al., 2008].
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sume that each consumer paid the same amount for the same product and prices stay
constant within the same week. Another important variable is a measure for market
concentration. I will use Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) and Concentration Ratio
4 (CR4) in product market to measure product market concentration.
3.3.2 Preliminary evidence
Negative effect of in-store promotions on retail prices
First, I ask whether the in-store promotions have any impact on retail prices. I would
like to incorporate the timing of promotion and pricing decisions in this chapter.
As I have discussed, in-store promotions are determined in advance, and retailers
choose retail prices later. Hence, the causal relationship I address is the impact of
in-store promotions on retail prices, not the other way around. In Table 3.1, I present
the result of OLS regression results with the retail price as the dependent variable.
The results show that in-store promotions negatively affect the retail prices. As an
example, in Figure 3·2, I present a preliminary pattern that retail price dropped when
the product was specially displayed.
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Table 3.1: The Effect of In-store Promotions on Retail Prices
Retail Prices
Display -0.305∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.0884∗∗∗ -0.0967∗∗∗
(0.00302) (0.00306) (0.00311) (0.00221)
Low-(Non-) fat -0.0374∗∗∗ -0.0357∗∗∗ -0.0356∗∗∗ -0.0225∗∗∗
(0.00171) (0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00141)
Saltiness 0.202∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.00199) (0.00197) (0.00196) (0.00166)
Additives -0.401∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗ -0.387∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗
(0.00189) (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00166)
Flavors -0.00723∗∗∗ -0.00328∗∗∗ -0.00290∗∗∗ -0.00171∗∗∗
(0.0000693) (0.0000703) (0.0000703) (0.0000571)
Price tag -0.352∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗
(0.00150) (0.00156) (0.00112)
Flyer -0.272∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗
(0.00285) (0.00202)
Constant 2.681∗∗∗ 2.730∗∗∗ 2.737∗∗∗ 2.830
(0.00245) (0.00242) (0.00242) (133.7)
Observations 1,918,228 1,918,228 1,918,228 1,918,228
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.100 0.104 0.552
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Every column includes quarter dummies to control for seasonal fluctuation.
The first three columns do not control for brand dummies, but the last column does.
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Figure 3·2: The Effect of In-store Displays on Retail Prices : Campbell
Chunky Example
Positive effect of in-store promotions on market concentration
To study the market concentration, I use three different measures. First, I use Herfind-
ahl Hirschman index (hereafter, HHI) for each store-week pair. HHI is calculated as a
sum of squared market shares of each brand in a market. Additionally, I use Concen-
tration Ratio 4 (hereafter, CR4) as an alternative measure for market concentration.
Lastly, I also consider Concentration Ratio 1 (hereafter, CR1).
To see if there is any simple linear relationship between the number of display
and market concentration in a market, I present Table 3.2. I find that the number of
total displays in soup category is positively correlated with the market concentration.
However, there is an endogeneity concern that concentration may also affect the
number of in-store special displays.
To address endogeniety issues, I use information on the number of displays in
other product categories as instruments. Table 3.3 uses the number of display in
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personal care product categories.5 The number of in-store displays across categories
can be correlated. However, it is not likely that the number of displays in personal
care categories affect the market concentration in the soup category. Also, I include
quarter dummies to control for seasonal demand. I find that the number of in-store
displays increases the market concentration in the soup category.
Table 3.2: Simple OLS Results : Total Display and Concentration
Market Concentration
HHI CR4 (%)
Total Displays 25.16∗∗∗ 18.32∗∗∗ 0.00955∗∗∗ 0.00868∗∗∗
(0.606) (0.624) (0.00166) (0.00173)
Total Price Tags -0.335∗ -0.00387∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.000365)
Total Store Flyers 8.141∗∗∗ 0.00759∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.000503)
Observations 70,308 70,308 70,308 70,308
Standard errors in parentheses
Every column includes quarter dummies to control for seasonal fluctuation.∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.3: The Effect on Market Concentration from IV regression
Market Concentration
HHI CR4(%)
Total Displays 96.33∗∗∗ 75.36∗∗∗ 0.0851∗∗∗ 0.0402∗∗
(7.067) (8.130) (0.0124) (0.0144)
Total Price Tags 3.116∗∗∗ 0.00747∗∗∗
(0.392) (0.000696)
Total Store Flyers 6.290∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.000569)
Observations 70,308 70,308 70,308 70,308
Standard errors in parentheses
Every column includes quarter dummies to control for seasonal fluctuation.∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5In personal care categories, I include tooth paste, tooth brush, shampoo, razors, and facial
tissue.
39
Evidences for vertical contracts over in-store promotions
According to interviews and product manufacturers’ annual reports, I find out that the
promotion contracts involve incentives to retailers in this industry. Despite anecdotal
evidences, the exact terms or the details of contracts are not available to the public.
In this subsection, I examine retailers’ pricing responses toward in-store display
contracts. If retailers receive monetary incentives from manufacturers in exchange for
promotional support, retailers’ pricing responses to in-store displays should differ for
store-brand products and national brand products. Retailers do not have a contract
with store-brand products, but they engage in vertical contracts with national brands’
products. The hypothesis is that national brand manufacturers provide incentives and
retailers respond more to national brands’ displays with low retail prices.
The dependent variable is the discount rate compared to the regular price.6 I use
dummy variables for national brand and in-store displays. I also include an interaction
term between the two as independent variables to capture retailers’ pricing responses
to in-store displays toward national brand products. In Table 3.4, I find that the
interaction term between national brands and in-store displays are positive. That
means the discount rates are greater for national brand products when displayed.
The relationship is even more surprising when I control for other promotion strategies.
While retailers raise retail prices of store-brand products, they lower retail prices of
national brand products when displayed. Hence, the result supports the hypothesis
that national brand manufacturers provide retailers with monetary incentives for
putting their products on special displays.
6Following the literature (for instance, [Hendel and Nevo, 2006]), I use the mode of prices at the
store as a regular price. The exact expression of the discount rates is (regular price−price)regular price .
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Evidence for Vertical Contracts
Discount Rate
National Brand 0.0109∗∗∗ -0.00925∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗
(0.000615) (0.000618) (0.000531)
Display 0.0414∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗ -0.0153∗∗∗
(0.00210) (0.00206) (0.00177)
National × Display 0.0959∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.0457∗∗∗
(0.00218) (0.00214) (0.00183)
Regular Price 0.0295∗∗∗ 0.0339∗∗∗
(0.000202) (0.000173)
Price tag 0.123∗∗∗
(0.000258)
Flyer 0.140∗∗∗
(0.000452)
Constant 0.0130∗∗∗ -0.00513∗∗∗ -0.0921∗∗∗
(0.000599) (0.000734) (0.000644)
Brand yes yes yes
Quarter no yes yes
N 1,222,068 1,222,068 1,222,068
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Unit of observation : Product line-store-week
Discount Rate = (Regular price-Price)/Regular price
Regular Price is mode of prices for each product at each store
National Brand =1 if the product is a national brand product, =0 otherwise.
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3.4 Model
I build structural models of the supply of the market based on the demand model in
Section 2.4. In the supply side of the market, manufacturers choose wholesale prices
with a wholesale price discount contract over in-store promotion.
3.4.1 Sequence
Given the terms of the contract over in-store promotions and availability, retailers
and manufacturers determine the in-store promotions for the next calendar year in
advance. I do not model in-store promotion decisions of each manufacturer in this
paper, but take them as given. The relevant contract terms for the in-store promotions
are modeled as a form of wholesale price discounts/premium. Manufacturers set
wholesale prices with a full information on in-store promotion contracts. Each week,
retailers set retail prices knowing all the wholesale prices and in-store promotion
decisions. In the following, I explain the model in a reverse order.
3.4.2 Retailer Profit Maximization
Retailers set the retail prices for the products available at the store to maximize the
category profit. I model neither retail competition nor dynamic pricing behavior in
this chapter. That is, each market, defined as a store-week pair, is independent. Each
store r chooses pjrt each week t to maximize:
pirrt =
∑
j∈Ar
(pjrt − wjrt)Mrtsjrt(P,Xjt, αi, βi, ξjrt),
where wjrt is the wholesale price of product j at store r at week t, and Mrt is the
total market size at each stores. I assume that retailers have no marginal cost other
than wholesale prices wjrt as I cannot separately identify different marginal costs.
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In reality, wholesale prices do not vary every week. However, other factors such as
promotional allowances affect the “actual” wholesale prices every week. This fact mo-
tivates a separate estimation of wholesale prices and other factors related to in-store
promotions. I model the wholesale prices as a sum of the base wholesale prices7 and
the wholesale price discounts/premiums tied to specific in-store promotion contracts.
To put it simply in expression,
wjrt = w¯jrt + d
d
rdisplayjrt + d
p
rprice tagjrt + d
f
rflyerjrt + ωjrt, (3.1)
where displayjrt, price tagjrt, and flyerjrt are dummy variables for each promotion
strategies. The first term w¯jrt is the base wholesale prices for the quarter that week
t lies in and ddr , d
p
r, and d
f
r stand for the wholesale price discount/premiums at store
r tied to contracts over displays, price tags, and flyers respectively. Recall that these
discounts are determined before the contract. There is an observational error jrt.
Note that the wholesale prices retailers consider in their profit maximization are
still wjrt. The equilibrium prices satisfy the first-order conditions in the following:
sjrt +
∑
k∈Ar
(pjrt − wjrt)∂skrt(P,Xkrt, αi, βi, ξjrt)
∂pjrt
= 0, ∀j ∈ Ar. (3.2)
3.4.3 Manufacturer Profit Maximization
Manufacturers set the wholesale prices for the products they produce to maximize
their profit. Recall that each market is independent. Therefore, manufacturers solve
profit maximization problems in each market separately. Let Ar ∩ Am be the set of
products manufacturer m sells at store r. Manufacturer m sets the wholesale prices
wjrt for the product j ∈ Amr at each retail store r for week t to maximize
7These are comparable to the formal wholesale prices in [Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005] which are
more stable than the “actual” wholesale prices retailers face each week.
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pimrt =
∑
j∈Ar∩Am
(wjrt − cjrq)Mrtsjrt(P (wm), Xjrt, αi, βi, ξjrt),
where cjrq is the marginal cost of production at each quarter q. The model allows each
manufacturer to set wholesale prices of the same product differently across different
stores.
However, manufacturers can choose only the base wholesale prices ¯wjrq in their
maximization problem. I model the manufacturers’ profit maximization as quarterly
profit maximization with quarterly varying base wholesale price ¯wjrq. I rewrite the
manufacturers’ profit maximization problem again. Manufacturer m sets the base
wholesale prices ¯wjrq for the product j ∈ Ar ∩ Am each quarter q to maximize
pimrq =
∑
j∈Ar∩Am
∑
t∈q
(wjrt − cjrq)Mrtsjrt(P (wrt), Xjrt, αi, βi, ξjrt),
where wjrt = w¯jrt + d
d
rdisplayjrt + d
p
rprice tagjrt + d
f
rflyerjrt + jrt.
The corresponding first-order conditions are
∑
t∈q
sjrt +
∑
k∈Ar∩Am
∑
t∈q
(wjrt − cjrq)∂skr(P (wrt), Xkt, αi, βi, ξjrt)
∂wjrt
= 0,∀j ∈ Ar ∩ Am.
(3.3)
3.5 Estimation
I model wholesale price as the only source of marginal cost for retailers. Using
first-order conditions of the retailers’ profit maximization (given in (3.2)), I calcu-
late the wholesale prices that retailers pay. Then, I divide the calculated wholesale
prices into two different parts, the base wholesale prices and the wholesale price dis-
counts/premiums for weekly in-store promotions. By exploiting the panel structure
of the data, I use a product-quarter fixed effect model to estimate the base wholesale
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prices for each store at each quarter using the expression in (3.1). I allow the base
wholesale prices to vary by store-product pairs while I allow the discounts to vary
only across stores. The latter implies that every manufacturer faces the same con-
tract terms over in-store promotions. The base wholesale prices change quarterly, but
the discounts/premiums stay constant throughout the year. I will present the results
with different specifications in Section 3.6 and the results remain similar.
I calculate manufacturers’ marginal costs using the first-order conditions of man-
ufacturers’ quarterly profit maximization problem (given in (3.3)). One important
implication from the modeling is that I allow manufacturers to choose more promo-
tional activities for products with higher marginal costs. Similarly, [Hristakeva, 2018]
finds that manufacturers’ slotting allowances are bigger for “niche” products.
3.6 Results
Using the first-order conditions of retailers’ profit maximization problem, I calculate
the wholesale price as retailers’ marginal costs. Figure 3·3 is the histogram of the
wholesale prices by in-store display status. In general, the wholesale prices retailers
face are lower for displayed products.
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Figure 3·3: Histogram of Wholesale Prices
Next, I estimate the base wholesale prices and the wholesale price discounts/premiums
tied to the in-store promotions. Figure 3·4 is the histogram of wholesale price dis-
counts/premiums associated with all three in-store promotions. The estimated whole-
sale price premiums associated with displays are mostly negative. In other words,
retailers gain from lower wholesale prices by providing promotional spaces. In Table
3.5, I show that the average wholesale price discount tied to in-store special displays
is approximately 8 cents in the U.S. dollar. In other words, manufacturers sell their
products at lower wholesale prices by 8 cents per product when the products will be
specially displayed at stores.
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Figure 3·4: Histogram of Wholesale Price Premiums by Promotions
Countercyclicality of wholesale prices
In the literature, there has been many studies that aim to find out why the retail
prices of seasonal goods go down when the demand reaches its peak. In this chapter,
I find some preliminary evidences that promotional allowances are bigger in the peak
demand season, which leads retailers to be able to lower the retail prices.
Table 3.5 presents the average wholesale price discounts/premiums for different in-
store promotions in different specifications. The results are consistent with what I find
for the consumer value of in-store promotions. The promotion strategies consumer
value more are more expensive to product manufacturers. In column (3), I show
the results by assuming the discounts tied to promotions can vary quarterly and by
stores. I find that the discounts are bigger in the cold seasons, which is consistent
with seasonal popularity of soup. However, I will use the results from quarterly
base wholesale prices and constant contract terms within a year, in column (2), in
the remaining analysis. In general, in-store promotions in this category are more
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common in colder seasons, which makes different approaches rather similar.
Table 3.5: The Wholesale Price Premiums for In-store Promotions
(1) (2) (3)
Aggregate By Stores By Stores & Quarters
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Display -0.089 -0.09 -0.088 -0.028 -0.091 -0.082
(0.106) (0.133) ( 0.139) (0.178) (0.168)
Price tags -0.238 -0.237 -0.255 -0.161 -0.211 -0.263
(0.093) (0.134) (0.105) (0.09) (0.145)
Flyer -0.203 -0.23 -0.213 -0.102 -0.244 -0.253
(0.114) (0.137) (0.135) (0.174) (0.18)
Standard errors in parentheses
Column (1) does not allow the base wholesale prices and discounts to vary across stores.
Column (2) allows the base wholesale prices and discounts to vary by stores.
Column (3) allows the base wholesale prices and discounts to vary by stores and quaters.
The base wholesale price estimates are more consistent with the actual data. The
base wholesale price estimates, similarly to wholesale prices used in [Chevalier et al.,
2003], are higher in colder seasons. Considering the discounts associated with in-store
promotions, the average wholesale prices are lower in cold seasons when the demand
experiences its peak. This pattern is reasonable in a sense that in-store promotions
are more valuable to manufacturers in the peak demand season, so they are willing to
pay more (i.e., sell their products at lower prices) to secure more in-store promotions
for their products.
3.7 The Effect of Vertical Contracts on Market Outcomes:
Retail Prices and Market Concentration
In this section, I study the impact of a counterfactual policy in which the government
bans the in-store display contracts to study the effect of the demand side and the
supply side of the market separately. I choose a representative store with the number
of displays big enough to study the counterfactual policy and with both price tiers.
By choosing a store with only low-priced manufacturers’ products on special display,
I analyze the effect of in-store display contracts on product market concentration. To
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disentangle the impacts of in-store display contracts separately, I simulate cases with
different timings of the policy and compare the changes between each step.
Price tiers in the product category
In the ready-to-serve wet soup category, we can divide product manufacturers into
two different groups: high price-high quality and low price-low quality. These two
different price-quality tiers are different in sizes, average price points, and product
qualities. I choose a representative market that carries both high price-high quality
and low price-low quality products. For example, Amy’s, Imagine (product by the
Hein-Celestial Company), and Pacific Natural Foods are high price-high quality prod-
ucts. In contrast, Campbells and Progresso are the examples of low price-low quality
products.
Timing of the counterfactual policy
In the counterfactual analysis, I study the effect of in-store displays itself and the effect
of contracts over it separately. To disentangle the effects, I compare the simulation
results with different timing of the banning policy. First, I assume that the policy
becomes active after the retail prices are fixed. This exercise captures the effect of
in-store displays themselves on market outcomes through consumer utility. Then, I
simulate the situation where the policy starts before the retailer fixes the retail prices.
This exercise allows us to see the retailer’s pricing responses to the banning policy.
Next, I assume that the policy timing is before the retailer pays the wholesale prices
to manufacturers. This policy bans the wholesale price discounts/premiums tied to
in-store displays.
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Disentagling effects on retail prices
In Table 3.6, I study the effect on the retail prices. The first column reports the
benchmark prices from the original scenario. Moving from the first to the last column
of Table 3.6, in-store display contracts are eliminated step by step. Recall that retail
prices remain unchanged from the first column to the second column. The third
column reports the retail prices in the scenario where retailers are allowed to choose
the optimal retail prices. By moving the products from special displays to main
product aisles, the retailer would lower the retail prices of those products. The
reason is that the retailer still has lower wholesale prices due to discounts. I can
interpret the case in the third column as the manufacturers providing the retailer with
incentives for price promotion, i.e., price discounts, instead of special displays. The
result implies that in-store displays lead retailers to raise the retail prices of displayed
products holding the wholesale prices constant. The result is consistent with the
demand results in Section 2.6. Next, I simulate the results without any wholesale price
discounts/premiums allowed. Without the wholesale price discounts/premiums, the
retailer does not have any incentive to promote the products anymore. That leads
to higher retail prices of those products. This result implies that the retail prices
of displayed products are lower due to vertical contracts over in-store displays, not
because of the consumer-side effect. Overall, the effect of vertical contracts is big,
and that leads to lower retail prices of the displayed products.
Table 3.6: The Effect of Banning Policy on Retail Prices
Original Dropping
Display
Varying
Retail Price
No Wholesale
Discount
Non-displayed 2.88 2.88 2.90 2.88
(0.89) (0.89) (0.92) (0.92)
Displayed 1.67 1.67 1.63 1.75
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Standard erros in parentheses
Displayed: Products that were on special displays before the counterfactual policy
Non-displayed: Products that were not on special displays before the counterfactual policy
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Disentangling effects on market shares
I examine the effect of the counterfactual policy on market shares. To be consistent,
I compare the counterfactual scenarios by changing the timing of the policy. By
removing any special display in the category, the products that were on displays lose
market share. This result is consistent with the demand estimation result in Chapter
2. Next, I examine the case where the retailers can choose the retail prices optimally
knowing that there will be no in-store display. In the third column in Table 3.7, I
find that the products gain back some of the market shares they lost due to lower
retail prices. Finally, I study the effect of wholesale price discounts/premiums on
market shares. I consider a case where the policy bans the in-store display contracts
altogether. The result shows that the retail prices are higher without the contracts,
which also results in the decrease in market shares.
Table 3.7: The Effect of Banning Policy on Within- Market Share
Original Dropping
Display
Varying
Retail Price
No Wholesale
Discount
Non-displayed 0.384 0.676 0.655 0.844
(0.028) (0.133) (0.128) (0.165)
Displayed 0.616 0.324 0.345 0.156
(0.157) (0.158) (0.168) (0.076)
Standard errors in parentheses
Displayed: Products that were on special displays before the counterfactual policy
Non-displayed: Products that were not on special displays before the counterfactual policy
Disentangling effects on retailer’s profit
In addition, I analyze the retail profit from different scenarios and present the result
in Table 3.8. By removing the special displays alone, the retailer loses 5 percent
of the retail profit without changing retail prices yet. Allowing the retail prices to
vary makes the retailer gain back some of the lost profit, almost 50 percent of lost
profit. However, if the wholesale price discounts/premiums are banned, the retail
profit decreases again by 22 percent. The retail profit decreases by 24 percent in
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total. This implies that retailers gain their profits mostly from monetary incentives
by manufacturers.
Table 3.8: The Effect of Banning Policy on Retail Profit
Original Dropping
Display
Varying
Retail Price
No Wholesale
Discount
Retail Profit 443.6 419.40 431.22 335.38
% change* -5.45 +2.81 -22.22
Retail profit in the U.S. dollar
* Percentage change from the last column
Heterogeneous benefits from in-store displays
The other important question I study in this chapter is whether in-store display in-
creases the market concentration. The demand estimation results predict that man-
ufacturers with higher price and small market shares benefit relatively more from
in-store displays due to the indirect effect on price elasticity. However, the partic-
ipation decisions are different across manufacturers. I simulate the counterfactual
scenarios where each product is on special display while there is no other product
on special display in the representative market. In this exercise, I do not allow any
wholesale price discount tied to in-store displays. I use the optimal prices simulated
in the previous counterfactual analysis. In Figure 3·5, I sort all the products available
by potential gains from in-store displays (with the highest gain on the top). I find
that smaller manufacturers benefit more from exclusive displays in general.
52
Figure 3·5: Manufacturers’ Potential Benefit from In-store Displays
Note: The product is sorted by the rank of potential gains from in-store displays from top to
bottom.
However, smaller manufacturers also have small price-cost margins according to
Figure 3·6. If we consider the wholesale price discount required by retailers, 12
cents at this specific store, many manufacturers with the highest potential benefits
may not be able to afford to have in-store displays without raising the base wholesale
prices. This finding sheds light on the effect of in-store promotion contracts on market
concentration. That is, while smaller companies may benefit most from in-store
promotions, the supply chain interactions over promotions may lead to more displays
allocated to big manufacturers with less benefit. In turn, the vertical contracts over
in-store promotions may lead to a more concentrated product market.
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Figure 3·6: Manufacturers’ Average Margins
3.8 Comparison with Chapter 2
In this section, I interpret the results from chapter 2 focusing on the effect on retail
prices and market concentration and compare them with the results in this chapter.
I explain the effect of a specific in-store promotion strategy, in-store special displays,
on market outcomes from the consumer demand side of the market from chapter
2. The demand estimation shows that in-store displays are a strategic substitute to
price cuts. That should lead to higher optimal prices for displayed products. The
demand results also predict less concentration with in-store displays in the industry
of interest. In the ready-to-serve wet soup category, there is a separation of price-
quality tiers. Manufacturers with big market shares tend to have low price-low quality
products while smaller manufacturers have high price-high quality products. Smaller
manufacturers’ products with higher price points face higher price elasticity because
they locate at the upper left corner of the demand curve. With the demand curve
shifting out and getting steeper, smaller manufacturers benefit relatively more from
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less price elasticity due to in-store displays.
However, this chapter argues that without considering the supply side of the mar-
ket, we may not be able to explain the actual realization of in-store promotions and
their impact on market outcomes. Consumers often find products of big manufac-
turers in promotional spaces. It is also more likely that displayed products have low
prices. These cannot be explained only by the consumer demand results above. From
supply estimation in this chapter, I find that there are monetary incentives tied to
in-store promotions provided by product manufacturers, which results in lower retail
prices of advertised products. Moreover, the relative benefits to smaller manufacturers
from in-store displays may disappear due to the presence of wholesale price discount
contracts. Smaller manufacturers tend to have lower margins, and they can find it
unprofitable in terms of the absolute profit to bid for in-store displays, which leads
to biased participation decisions and higher concentration in the product market.
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Chapter 4
Multi-unit Ownership in the Fast Food
Industry
4.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the franchising ownership allocation problem in the retail food
sector. In the retail food industry, the modal form of unit growth is through fran-
chising agreements. More specifically, in the fast food industry, many companies
have achieved market expansion through franchising. In the franchising industry, an
important trend is the emergence and growth of multi-unit franchisees (an individ-
ual franchisee who owns several units of same trademarks). Multi-unit franchising
is of great importance in many industries for both chain companies and small busi-
ness owners. More specifically, multi-unit franchising has been an effective way to
achieve faster unit growth and maintain the quality of trademarks to be consistent
across franchised units. However, economic literature has not yet fully understood the
multi-unit franchising phenomenon. In this chapter, I explore multi-unit franchising
in the fast food industry.
The main objective of this chapter is twofold. First, I aim to establish the patterns
of multi-unit franchising empirically. Focusing on variables measuring scale economies
and density economies, I examine the preference of the franchisor for franchisees when
allocating new unit ownership. Second, I explore two potential reasons for multi-unit
franchising use, better performance, and easier access to capital. I study the effect of
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franchisees’ characteristics on unit performance and the effect of access to capital on
firms’ organizational choice. I conduct empirical analyses to see how the size of the
unit network and monitoring cost of owner affects the longevity of each unit in the
data. In addition, I examine the effect of capital market conditions on the dependence
on multi-unit franchising.
By utilizing a publicly available dataset on business ownership information in
the state of Texas, I examine the pattern of multi-unit franchising in the fast food
industry. Methodologically, I use a multinomial logit model to see the pattern of unit
ownership allocation of a big company in the fast food industry. As a result, I find
that the franchisor of interest prefers bigger franchisees with a closer unit network.
The result is consistent with a franchisor that considers monitoring cost incurred by
franchisees when allocating an additional unit. I also find that the franchisor values
existing franchisees’ operation experience.
Moreover, I empirically study the two potential reasons for multi-unit franchising.
First, I examine the important aspects of multi-unit franchising, the economies of
scale and the economies of density. I find that multi-unit franchisees’ units remain
active in business longer than single-unit franchisees. Second, consistent with ex-
isting literature, I find that monitoring cost measured by distances to headquarters
negatively affects units’ survival. However, I find that it is important to control for
unobserved entrepreneurial quality of multi-unit franchisees when comparing fran-
chisees’ performance.
Further, I test a hypothesis of whether access to capital affects franchisor’s de-
cisions on ownership allocation. By using exogenous shocks in the housing market
faced by potential new franchisees, I show that the franchisor uses multi-unit fran-
chising more in a market with higher uncertainty in the financial market. I find that
after the recent financial crisis, the chain uses more multi-unit ownership. I also use
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housing values in each market to measure different levels of asset shocks and find
similar results of organizational format choice.
4.1.1 Related literature
This chapter generally relates to the vast literature of franchising. Among differ-
ent types of organization, franchising has drawn so much attention in the literature
of economics and management.1 As the theoretical literature has developed, em-
pirical papers such as [Lafontaine et al., 1992] provide some empirical evidence on
theoretical predictions in the franchising industry. Also, there have been many pa-
pers on the effect of ownership on performance in the context of franchising. For
instance, [Ji and Weil, 2015] studies the impact of franchising use on labor law com-
pliance. [Ackermann, 2016] uses exogenous change to ownership in the retail food
industry and studies whether franchisees perform better than company managers.
More recently, [Lafontaine et al., 2019] studies the effect of franchising on survival
and growth.
More specifically, this chapter focuses on multi-unit franchising as an organiza-
tional form. In the first part of empirical analysis, I establish the pattern of multi-unit
franchising in the fast food industry. Multi-unit franchising has been really popular
as an effective way to grow faster in the fast food industry. Therefore, many pa-
pers aim to explain the reason and the consequence of multi-unit franchising. For
example, [Kaufmann and Dant, 1996] studies multi-unit franchising as a way to grow
faster. [Go´mez et al., 2010] test different hypotheses regarding multi-unit franchising.
The closest study to the first part of this chapter is [Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2004]
which studies franchisors’ ownership allocation decisions using the same source of the
data I use. The authors establish the pattern of multi-unit franchising in the fast
food industry. While the first part of this chapter is based on the same approach
1 [Bradach, 1998] and [Blair et al., 2005] provide excellent overview of the franchising industry.
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with [Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2004], it explores the effect of important factors in
multi-unit franchising in unit performance and firms’ organizational decisions.
In the second part of empirical analysis, I explore the effects of franchisees’ char-
acteristics on performance. By focusing on the duration of unit operation, I study the
effect of two different franchisee characteristics I find important in the first part of
empirical analysis, the size of existing network and the monitoring cost. First, I exam-
ine whether multi-unit franchisees perform better. Second, I aim to examine whether
the monitoring cost measured by distance to headquarters affects the survival of each
unit. Close studies in the previous literature include [Bates, 1998] and [Kalnins and
Lafontaine, 2013]. Consistent with the previous literature, I find that business perfor-
mance is negatively affected by monitoring cost of its owner. Further, I aim to examine
whether the effect of scale economies is overestimated by controlling for the ownership
allocation in the future similarly in [Lafontaine and Shaw, 2016] and [Lazear, 2005].
As [Gru¨nhagen and Mittelstaedt, 2005] discuss in their paper, multi-unit franchisees
can be inherently different from single-unit franchisees.
In the third part, I then study whether capital constraints affect the organiza-
tional decisions of the franchisor, specifically its dependence on multi-unit franchising.
Exploiting shocks in the housing market, I examine the effect of exogenous shocks
to financial constraints on firm’s unit allocation decisions. In the previous litera-
ture, [Martin, 1988] points out that credit market conditions appear to influence the
organizational decision in the short run. Also, [Kaufmann and Dant, 1996] study the
reasons for multi-unit franchising use and points to better access to capital as the
most important reason for multi-unit franchising. Recently, [Fan et al., 2017] use a
structural model to study how collateralizable asset values affect firms’ organizational
choices in the context of franchising.
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4.2 Industry Background
Multi-unit Franchising
In the franchising industry, one of the most important trends is the emergence and
growth of multi-unit franchisees. Multi-unit franchisees own several units of the same
chain, while single-unit franchisees own only one unit in the system. Most franchisees
own one unit, a small number of multi-unit franchisees own most units in many
industries. As shown earlier in [Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2004], I find that less than
50 percent of franchisees own more than 80 percent of units in a big fast food chain
in Texas (shown in Table 4.1).
As the franchising industry has become more mature, multi-unit franchising leads
to even bigger franchisees with more than 50 units in the same system. Those fran-
chisees are no longer manager-owners. Rather, they are operating many units in the
system and hiring managers themselves to monitor the units they own. Again, in a
later section, I will show that the pattern of growth of multi-unit franchisees. This
pattern is more evident after the recent recession in 2008.
Fast Food Franchises
I focus on the retail fast food industry where franchising is heavily used. In general,
the operation is relatively simple and easy to learn, which makes business-format
franchising desirable. In addition, the retail fast food industry is characterized by the
importance of each location. Considering the homogeneity of products in the fast food
industry, the most important factor in the industry is the geographic location of stores.
Particularly, multi-unit franchising is prevalent in the fast food industry. Overall, the
fast food industry provides a good setting to study multi-unit franchising because
“the typical location-based franchise system (of which the fast-food franchises is the
prime and model example) is populated with multi-unit franchisees.”( [Kaufmann
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and Dant, 1996])
In the empirical analysis of this chapter, I focus on a specific company, Subway
Sandwiches because of two important characteristics. Most importantly, the company
is completely franchisee-owned. Without any company-owned units, I can assume
that the company uses only two ways of unit allocation (new franchisee vs. existing
franchisees). Also, I can avoid the issues regarding endogenous location choices of
franchised units compared to company-owned units. Moreover, Subway Sandwiches
has grown very fast for the past few decades. The company has grown to have 23,850
total units in 2010, compared to McDonald’s with 14,027 total units. (QSR Magazine)
One potential reason for huge unit growth is the company’s simple operation and
narrow scope of the business, even compared to its close fast-food competitors such
as McDonald’s and Burger King.
4.3 Data
The main source of the data is Texas Sales and Use Tax Permit Holder Information
database. The database includes addresses of businesses, the dates the license begins
(and ends, if applicable). In addition, the dataset includes the owners’ addresses,
which I use as their headquarter information (if possible). More importantly, the
database includes a unique ownership identity information for each business. Using
the store addresses and the headquarter addresses in the main dataset, I geocoded
all the units and corresponding headquarters under the business name “Subway” in
the database.
I supplement the main dataset with various demographic information from the
Census at the 5-digit zip code level. Specifically, I use the information on population,
median income, the proportion of the urban population, and black population ratio
at each zip code level market. Lastly, I calculate housing prices (adjusted in 2000
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dollars) in each 5-digit zip code level market by gathering the information on housing
price index from Federal Housing Finance Agency, combined with housing prices in
2000 from Census and Consumer Price Index(CPI) from Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Preliminary Patterns of Multi-unit Franchising
Before I present the empirical methodology and its results, I present some preliminary
patterns of the data.
Pattern 1. Growth of Subway Sandwiches in the number of units
The first evident feature of the data is that the company has grown fast during the
past three decades. In Figure 4·1, I show that the company has added so many new
units in the state of Texas starting from 2000. However, after the recent recession in
2008, the number of new unit allocations has been decreasing over time as in Figure
4·2.
Figure 4·1: Total Number of Stores
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Figure 4·2: Total Number of New Ownership Allocations
Pattern 2. Multi-unit franchising and its growth
There is a trend toward multi-unit franchising in the data. Figure 4·3 presents the
scatter plot of the number of stores each franchisee owns. It shows that big franchisees
get even bigger. This pattern is more evident after the recession in 2008. In Table
4.1, I show that multi-unit franchisees (roughly 50 percent of all the franchisees) own
85 percent of the units in the system.
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Figure 4·3: Total Number of Stores by Owners
Key Variables of Interest
Table 4.2 lists the variables of interest and the expected effect on unit allocation.
The key variables of interest are the numbers of existing units of franchisees, the
distances to the closest existing units of each existing franchisees and the distances
to the headquarters of existing franchisees.
First, I construct the variable for the size of each existing franchisees’ unit net-
works. I use the total number of units that each franchisee owns each year. I expect
that the number of existing units of each franchisee increases the probability of being
allocated with an additional unit in the system. That is, I expect that the franchisor
prefers a bigger franchisee to smaller franchisees. I also include the squared size of
the existing unit network and expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative.
Second, I utilize the information on each franchisees’ existing units to construct
the measures for density economies. Using geocoded locations of existing units, I
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Table 4.1: Multi-Unit Franchising Patterns
Number of Franchisees and Their Sizes
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
1 3 10 82 171 180 226 244 290
2 1 38 57 64 82 83 83
3 to 5 1 29 65 60 86 90 105
6 to 10 4 18 18 34 38 39
11 to 20 6 11 15 17 23
21 to 50 4 7 11
51 + 1 2
Total Owner 3 12 153 317 333 447 487 553
MUF Owner 0 2 71 146 153 221 243 263
MUF Ratio 0 0.17 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.48
Total Unit 3 15 293 734 800 1272 1566 1905
MUF Unit 0 5 211 563 620 1046 1322 1615
MUF Owns 0 0.33 0.72 0.77 0.78 0.82 0.84 0.85
MUF owns presents the percentage of units owned by multi-unit franchisees.
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calculated the geographical distance between existing units and the new unit in miles.
Then, I use the minimum of these distances for each existing franchisees. I expect
the coefficient on this variable to be negative because the franchisor would want
franchisees to monitor their units more closely.
Third, I use the distances to the headquarters of each franchisee in order to control
for additional monitoring cost incurred by each franchisee. Similarly, I would expect
the coefficient to be negative. In the previous literature in the franchising industry,
[Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2004] and [Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2013] find that the
distance to the headquarter of franchisees is important both in the probability of
getting the additional unit expansion and the survival of each unit.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
4.4.1 Patterns of Ownership Allocation: Multi-Unit Franchising
In the first part of empirical analysis, I use a multinomial logit model in the main
analysis in order to see if there are any specific franchisee characteristics that the
franchisor prefers as a franchisee.
Each new unit is indexed by i and each owner is indexed by j.
yij = α0 + α1Sizeij + α2Squared Sizeij
+ δ1Distanceij + δ2HQ Distanceij
+ β1Tenureij + β2Experienceij + β3Last Sinceij + β4Same Zipij
+ λ1Dif in Population + λ2Dif in Income
+ λ3Dif in Urban + λ4Dif in Black + εij
(4.1)
where yij is a binary variable, which takes a value of one if the owner is chosen to be
allocated with a new unit in the franchise system. Again, each variable of interest is
defined in Table 4.2.
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4.4.2 Why Multi-Unit Franchising?
In the second part of the analysis, I aim to explore the reasons why the franchisors pre-
fer multi-unit franchisees to single-unit franchisees. In the previous literature, many
papers including [Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2004] and [Kaufmann and Dant, 1996]
present various advantages of multi-unit franchising. In this chapter, I empirically
examine the two main reasons for multi-unit franchising.
Better performance : Survival analysis
First, I would like to see if the franchisor prefers multi-unit franchising because multi-
unit franchisees are better performers. Because there is no data on unit performance
such as revenue or profit available to researchers, I define the longevity of each unit as
a success. Specifically, I use a survival analysis approach to analyze whether the size
of the franchisees’ unit network increases or decreases the hazard of failure. I include
all the units with relevant information and define permanent closure or change in
ownership as a failure. The dependent variable in the analyses is the duration until
the failure of each unit. I use the information on the date that the license begins (and
ends) to construct the duration of each unit. If the unit is still active in the dataset,
I use November 20, 2017, as the license end date for the unit. The key independent
variable is the size of its owner. If the coefficient on the size of its owner is negative,
it suggests that bigger owners are less likely to exit.
As parametric models, I use a Weibull distribution, and an exponential distribu-
tion where the hazard of exit can be written as a function of covariates.2 The hazard
rate of exit of each unit in a Weibull distribution is denoted by h(t). The Weibull
model is as follows:
2Exponential distribution is a special case of Weibull distribution where the shape parameter
p = 1.
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h(t) = h0(t)exp(Xβ)
= pt(p−1)exp(Xβ)
(4.2)
where β is a vector of coefficients and X is the vector of covariates. The most
important covariate I consider in this analysis is the size of the existing unit network
at the time of opening. I also include the distance to owner’s headquarter as a proxy
for monitoring cost as in [Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2013]. If the shape parameter p of
a Weibull distribution is greater than 1, the failure rate increases over time. If the
shape parameter is less than 1, the failure rate decreases with time.
Better performance: Logit model
As an alternative approach, I use a logit model for survival for 1 through 5 years with
the same set of independent variables. I estimate the model in the following:
Survivali = b0 + b1Sizei + b2HQ Distance + i (4.3)
where Survivali are the binary variables which equals to 1 if the unit survives for
1,2 or 5 years after the opening. Similarly, if the coefficient on the size of existing
network, b0, is positive, the size of unit network is positively correlated with a higher
probability of survival. I also expect b2 to be negative as the monitoring cost is more
likely to affect the survival of each unit negatively.
However, it is important to note that the empirical analyses above do not take
into account the possibility of endogenous growth of multi-unit franchisee with (unob-
served) better entrepreneurial ability. There may be two different reasons for multi-
unit franchisees’ units to perform better. On the one hand, multi-unit franchisees can
benefit directly from owning several units at the same time. For example, multi-unit
owners may use local promotions better if they own close units in the area. That is,
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owning more units increases the probability of success. On the other hand, it is also
possible that multi-unit franchisees are naturally better entrepreneurs than single-unit
franchisees. In this case, I can interpret the better performance of bigger franchisees’
units as an outcome of better entrepreneurial quality of multi-unit franchisees.
In the next specification, therefore, I aim to control for unobserved owner quality
when studying the effect of size on survival. In other words, I test a hypothesis
that multi-unit franchisees are more successful because there is a direct benefit from
owning several units at the same time. The model to estimate is:
Survivali = b0 + b1Sizei + b2HQ Distance + b3Room to growi + i (4.4)
where Room to growi is measured by the difference between the maximum number
of units the owner of unit i and the number of current units in the network. The
idea behind this specification is that the growth of the unit network in the future
should not affect the direct benefit of owning multi-units in the system today, which
is similar with the one in [Lafontaine and Shaw, 2016] and [Lazear, 2005]. If b1 remains
positive after controlling for the future room to grow as multi-unit franchisees, multi-
unit franchisees are more successful (at least partly) because they experience the
economies of scale. Otherwise, the result suggests that the benefit from operating
several units together can be overestimated by the difference in owner quality. I
control for the number of years left in the data in order to take into account the
potential bias that opening year can cause.
Better access to capital
In this subsection, I study the second potential reason for multi-unit franchising, easier
access to capital by existing franchisees. To put it differently, this section examines
the effect of access to capital in a market on the use of multi-unit franchising. As I
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mentioned earlier, there can be two different reasons for franchisors to prefer multi-
unit franchisees to single-unit franchisees. First, multi-unit franchisees operate their
units better than single-unit franchisees. Also, it is also possible that it is costly for
franchisors to identify a suitable new franchisee. Hence, I test whether the company
chooses to allocate a unit to a multi-unit franchisee because of financial constraints
faced by potential franchisees in this subsection. More specifically, I use a fixed effect
regression with panel data in order to show whether financial conditions in a 5-digit
zip code level market affect the ratio of multi-unit franchising in the market.
I run the following regression:
MUF Ratiozt = γ0 + γ1Urbanzt + γ2After 2008t
+ γ3Urbanzt × After 2008t + ωzt
(4.5)
The dependent variable in the analysis is a ratio of units owned by multi-unit
franchisees. I consider the recent great recession as an exogenous shock to potential
new franchisees’ access to required capital to start a new business. Potentially, there
can be two major reasons for the effect of the recession on multi-unit franchising to
be positive. First, It is possible that franchisors would like to avoid uncertainty in the
financial market during the recession. Second, it is also possible that there is a smaller
population of potential new franchisees with enough capital. Hence, the expected sign
of the coefficient on After 2008t, γ2 is positive. The key variable of interest is the
interaction term, Urbanzt × After 2008t. I would expect the effect of the financial
crisis to be smaller in an urban area with a bigger pool of potential franchisees.
Again, an alternative explanation is that the franchisor may have a weaker preference
for existing franchisees with previous experience in the urban market, where local
knowledge is less valuable. In turn, I expect γ3 to be negative. I also include year
dummies (depending on specifications) in order to control for other unobserved market
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conditions.
As an alternative specification, I use a different regression using the information
on housing values in 5-digit zip code level markets. In order to see if the franchisor
prefers multi-unit franchisees because of easier access to capital, I test whether higher
asset value of housing in each market decreases the use of multi-unit franchising. I
run the following regression:
MUF Ratiozt = θ0 + θ1Housing Valuezt
+ θ2Market Characteristicszt + zt
(4.6)
The key independent variable is the (log of) median housing value in a 5-digit
zip code level market. I use an exogenous shock in the housing market to measure
the ease of capital acquisition in each market. In the previous literature, scholars
provide empirical evidence that housing collateral affects entrepreneurial entry deci-
sions.3 Each market faces different levels of shocks in the housing market, leading to
different levels of housing asset values. By using the information on housing values, I
examine the effect of potentially new franchisees’ collateralizable asset values on the
franchisor’s ownership allocation decisions, the ratio of multi-unit franchising in the
market. It is more likely that franchisors allocate more units to multi-unit franchisees
where the housing market experiences bigger shocks in asset values. In turn, I expect
θ1 to be negative as the franchisor prefers multi-unit franchisees in the markets with
bigger asset shocks. As observed market characteristics, I use the information on pop-
ulation, urban ratio and black ratio. To control for unobserved market characteristics
in each year, I also include year dummies.
Lastly, as a hybrid specification, I check whether the effect of financial constraints
faced by potential new franchisees on the ratio of multi-unit franchisees’ units is less
3There exist many papers on the relationship between housing prices and entrepreneurship deci-
sions such as [Disney and Gathergood, 2009] and [Schmalz et al., 2017].
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important in a more urban area. I run the following regression:
MUF Ratiozt = ψ0 + ψ1Housing Valuezt + ψ2Urbanzt
+ ψ3Housing Valuezt × Urbanzt + υzt
(4.7)
The dependent variable in the analysis is a ratio of units owned by multi-unit
franchisees. Following the same intuition above, I expect the coefficient on the inter-
action term, ψ3, to be negative, which implies that the effect of access to capital on
the ratio of multi-unit franchising is less important in a more urban area.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Patterns of Ownership Allocation: Multi-Unit Franchising
I use a multinomial logit model to analyze the effect of franchisees’ characteristics on
the probability of being allocated with additional unit in the system.
Effect of network size on ownership allocation
First, I examine the effect of franchisees’ sizes on the probability of being allocated
with an additional unit in the system. As a result, I find that the franchisor (“Subway
Sandwiches”) is more likely to allocate new units to a bigger franchisee. In the
last specification, despite the negative coefficient on the squared network sizes, the
estimation result implies the optimal number of units in the network is quite big,
which is around 50 units.
Effect of network density on ownership allocation
Next, I analyze the effect of franchisees’ network density on ownership allocation
in the system. As measures for franchisees’ monitoring costs, I use two different
measures, the minimum distance to existing units and the distance to headquarters.
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Table 4.3: Conditional Logit Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Scale economies
Size 0.0934∗∗∗ 0.0897∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.00127) (0.00174) (0.00181)
Squared Size -0.000847∗∗∗ -0.000902∗∗∗ -0.00107∗∗∗
(0.0000167) (0.0000229) (0.0000234)
Density economies
ln(Distance to Unit) -0.920∗∗∗ -0.633∗∗∗ -0.633∗∗∗
(0.00554) (0.00632) (0.00641)
ln(Distance to Headquarter) -0.311∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗
(0.00535) (0.00668) (0.00680)
Franchisee characteristics
Tenure -0.117∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(0.00599) (0.00608)
Experience -0.0365∗∗∗ -0.0356∗∗∗
(0.00398) (0.00403)
Same Zipcode 5.231∗∗∗ 4.746∗∗∗
(0.0262) (0.0264)
Last Since -0.427∗∗∗ -0.476∗∗∗
(0.00975) (0.0100)
Demographic differences
Dif in ln(Population) -0.140∗∗∗
(0.0330)
Dif in ln(Income) -2.559∗∗∗
(0.0628)
Dif in Urban -3.110∗∗∗
(0.0873)
Dif in Black -3.948∗∗∗
(0.169)
Observations 3532798 3532798 3502906
Pseudo R2 0.286 0.501 0.518
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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I find that the coefficients on both variables are negative in their sign, meaning that
the franchisor prefers a closer franchisee. However, I cannot rule out the possibility
that the franchisor prefers a closer franchisee because of similar market experience
and local knowledge. To control for the market knowledge, I include the binary
variable which takes the value of one if the franchisee has previous experience in the
same zip code level market. Even in the specifications including that binary variable,
the minimum distance to the existing unit negatively affects the probability of being
allocated with an additional unit. I interpret this result to mean that the franchisor
takes into account the monitoring cost of franchisees when allocating ownership to
franchisees.
Effect of operation experience on ownership allocation
Lastly, I study the effect of franchisee’s past experiences in the chain system on
additional unit allocation. First of all, I show whether the number of years each
franchisee has operated in the system affects the probability of getting an additional
unit. It is surprising to see that the franchisor prefers younger franchisees (with less
experience) when allocating additional units. It is possible that the franchisor cares
about whether franchisees will retire soon, consistent with [Kalnins and Lafontaine,
2004]. By including the differences in market characteristics, it is shown that the
franchisor prefers franchisees with similar market experience. Similarly, I find that
the franchisor prefers franchisees with past experiences in the same zip code level
market.
4.5.2 Why Multi-Unit Franchising?
Better performance : Survival analysis
In Table 4.4 and 4.5, I present the results from survival analyses, the Cox proportional
hazard model and two different parametric models. The results show that the size of
75
each franchisees’ network decreases the hazard of exit. In Figure 4·4, I graphically
show that the multi-unit franchisees are expected to survive longer than single-unit
franchisees using a Cox proportional hazard model. Although the results show that
the size of the existing unit network decreases the failure rate, one needs to be careful
when interpreting the results. It is possible that endogeneity issues or selection bias
with unobserved owner quality and the size of owners drive the results above.
Table 4.4: Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Dep. variable: Rate of exit
(1) (2)
ln(Size) -0.396∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗
(-15.00) (-15.36)
ln(Distance to HQ) 0.0395∗∗∗
(3.70)
Observations 4206 4206
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 4·4: Survival by Multi-unit Franchising Status : Cox Model
In Table 4.5, the results are, in general, consistent with the Cox proportional
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hazard model. First, the more the franchisee’s unit network is, the longer the unit
survives. Again, it is important to note that there might be an endogeneity issue to
interpret the result and establish a causal relationship. Although the coefficient on
the monitoring cost is statistically insignificant, the sign of the coefficient is positive
as expected. Moreover, it is shown that the shape parameter is greater than 1. That
implies the failure rate increases over time. It is consistent with the fact that the fast
food industry has become more mature and competitive.
Another important feature of empirical evidence is that the distances to head-
quarters negatively affect units’ performance. Despite its statistical insignificance
depending on models, it is consistently shown that monitoring cost incurred by trav-
eling from headquarters to each unit increases the failure rate of each unit. Consistent
with the previous literature such as [Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2013], this result implies
that it is important for franchisors to consider locations of potential franchisees’ unit
network and headquarters when allocating an additional unit.4
Table 4.5: Parametric Model : Duration Regressions
Dep. variable: Rate of exit
Weibull Exponential
ln(Size) -0.319∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(-12.38) (-12.58) (-10.64) (-10.81)
ln(Distance to HQ) 0.0275∗ 0.0229∗
(2.49) (2.08)
Constant -19.14∗∗∗ -19.25∗∗∗ -5.812∗∗∗ -5.906∗∗∗
(-54.40) (-54.24) (-121.31) (-89.32)
Shape 1.138∗∗∗ 1.139∗∗∗
(64.91) (64.94)
Observations 4206 4206 4206 4206
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
4As a robustness check, I use different specifications with various franchisee characteristics. I
find that franchisees’ tenure decreases the hazard of exit, but the results are inconsistent with their
statistical significance.
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Better performance: Logit model
As an alternative approach to show the effect of multi-unit franchising on the success
of the business, I use a logit model for survival for 1,2 and 5 years. In Table 4.6, I
present the results consistent with the duration regression. The sample includes only
the units that opened before 2016, 2015 and 2012, respectively. The result shows
that the size of the existing unit network is related to the long operation. Again,
the monitoring cost measured by the distance to headquarters is negatively related
to longer survival despite statistical insignificance.
Table 4.6: Logit Regression for Survival
Dep. variable: Survival = 1 if survive for
1 year 2 year 5 year
ln(Size) 0.317∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗
(4.54) (7.94) (11.45)
ln(Distance to HQ) -0.0485 -0.0439∗ -0.0383∗
(-1.63) (-2.03) (-2.07)
Constant 2.042∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗∗ -0.340∗∗
(12.16) (8.10) (-3.24)
Observations 4184 4131 3587
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In Table 4.7, however, I present the results controlling for the number of units
that will be allocated to the owner in the future. I show that the coefficient on the
size of the owner’s unit network is statistically insignificant once I add the variable
Room to Grow. The results suggest that it is important for researchers to control
for owners’ innate quality when comparing units’ performance. These results are
consistent with the industry background that franchisors face the high cost of finding
good franchisees.( [Bradach, 1998]) As robustness checks, I estimate similar linear
probability model and probit model and find consistent results.5
5I present the corresponding results in Table B.2, B.3, B.4 and B.5.
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Table 4.7: Logit Regression for Survival Controlling for Innate Quality
Dep. variable: Survival = 1 if survive for
1 year 2 year 5 year
ln(Size) 0.0444 0.0661 0.0313
(0.54) (1.07) (0.56)
ln(Distance to HQ) -0.0503 -0.0470∗ -0.0462∗
(-1.70) (-2.16) (-2.40)
Room to Grow 0.0494∗∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗ 0.0879∗∗∗
(3.76) (6.62) (10.14)
Years Left -0.0432∗∗∗ -0.0505∗∗∗ -0.0701∗∗∗
(-5.98) (-9.33) (-12.74)
Constant 3.015∗∗∗ 2.132∗∗∗ 1.331∗∗∗
(12.79) (12.33) (8.24)
Observations 4184 4131 3587
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Better access to capital
Now, I show that the effect of the shrunk value of an asset of potential franchisees
is smaller in an urban area with a bigger pool of potential owners. In Table 4.8,
the coefficient on After 2008it, γ2, is positive, as expected. That implies that the
franchisor tends to allocate new units to existing franchisees after the recent recession.
This tendency can be either due to a smaller pool of potential franchisees with enough
capital or due to franchisor’s intent to avoid risk after the recession. Most importantly,
the coefficient on the interaction term, γ3, is negative and statistically significant. In
general, the result is consistent with the hypothesis that organizational form decision
is related to financial constraint faced by franchisees.6
Next, I present the results for an alternative regression (given in 4.6) using the
information on housing values in each market. The results in Table 4.9 imply that
multi-unit franchising is more prevalent in markets where potential franchisees are
6As robustness checks, I use different cutoffs for multi-unit franchising and find consistent results
in general (provided in Table B.6, B.7, and B.8 for MUFs who owns more than 5 units and in Table
B.9, B.10 and B.11 for MUFs who owns more than 20 units).
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Table 4.8: Multi-unit Franchisees’ Better Access to Capital I
Dep. variable: MUF Ratio
(1) (2)
Urban × After 2008 0.126∗∗∗ -0.0572∗
(4.81) (-2.50)
Urban Ratio 0.185∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(5.39) (5.41)
After 2008 0.159∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗
(6.78) (21.82)
Black Ratio 0.647∗∗∗ -0.00652
(10.62) (-0.12)
ln(Total Population) 0.183∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗
(20.22) (7.77)
Observations 19866 19866
MUF Ratio=Total Number of Stores owned by MUFTotal Number of Stores
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
All columns includes 5-digit level zip code market dummies
The last column includes year dummies
financially more constrained by less valuable housing asset. However, the coefficient
on Housing Value becomes statistically insignificant once I control for unobserved
macroeconomic shocks by including year dummies. It is possible that exogenous
shocks in housing market affect not only potential new franchisees but also existing
franchisees. Figure 4·5 shows that the organizational choice is related to financial
constraints faced by potential franchisees.
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Table 4.9: Multi-unit Franchisees’ Better Access to Capital II
Dep. variable: MUF Ratio
(1) (2)
ln(Housing Value) -0.225∗∗∗ -0.00917
(-12.07) (-0.42)
Urban Ratio 0.236∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(6.54) (5.36)
Black Ratio 0.892∗∗∗ -0.0246
(13.96) (-0.44)
ln(Total Population) 0.257∗∗∗ 0.0631∗∗∗
(27.73) (7.80)
Observations 19753 19753
MUF Ratio=Total Number of Stores owned by MUFTotal Number of Stores
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
All columns includes 5-digit level zip code market dummies
The last column includes year dummies
Figure 4·5: Correlation between MUF Ratio and Housing Values
Lastly, I show that financial constraint faced by potential new franchisees affects
the franchisor’s organizational decision less in an urban area. In Table 4.10, the
coefficient on the interaction term between Urban and Housing Value is negative,
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while the coefficient on Housing Value itself is positive.7 Again, the results imply that
financial shocks to potential new franchisees leads to more multi-unit franchising in
the market and its importance is smaller in a more urban area.
Table 4.10: Multi-unit Franchisees’ Better Access to Capital III
Dep. variable: MUF Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Urban × ln(Housing Value) -0.573∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗
(-8.53) (-4.28)
ln(Housing Value) -0.225∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(-12.07) (4.70) (3.81)
Urban Ratio 0.236∗∗∗ 6.935∗∗∗ 2.986∗∗∗
(6.54) (8.82) (4.51)
Black Ratio 0.892∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ -0.0383
(13.96) (13.11) (-0.69)
ln(Total Population) 0.257∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.0681∗∗∗
(27.73) (28.57) (8.33)
Observations 19753 19753 19753
MUF Ratio=Total Number of Stores owned by MUFTotal Number of Stores
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
All columns includes 5-digit level zip code market dummies
The last column includes year dummies
In sum, I show that financial conditions faced by franchisees affect the franchisor’s
organizational choice in this subsection. Consistent with [Kaufmann and Dant, 1996],
the results show that the difficulty of capital acquisition is related to multi-unit fran-
chising.
7With an alternative dependent variable, relative growth of multi-unit franchising similarly in
[Fan et al., 2017], results are somewhat inconsistent provided in Table B.12, B.13, and B.14 in
Appendix B.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In Chapter 2 and 3, I study in-store promotions in supermarkets in the ready-to-
serve canned soup category. By incorporating vertical relationships between upstream
manufacturers and downstream retailers, I study the effect of in-store promotions on
product market outcomes focusing on in-store special displays. By exploiting the
variation in special displays in the U.S. scanner data, I model both demand and
supply side of the product market to quantify consumers value for in-store displays and
relevant contract terms between firms. From the discrete choice demand estimation,
I find that consumers do enjoy in-store displays themselves. In addition, the results
show that in-store displays make consumer demand less price elastic. By modeling the
supply side of the product market with a linear pricing model accompanied with the
wholesale price discount contracts over in-store promotions, I find that there exists
monetary transfer from manufacturers to retailer in exchange for in-store display
opportunity and its magnitude corresponds to roughly 3 percent of the average retail
price in the product category.
In Chapter 4, I study the multi-unit franchising in the fast food industry. Multi-
unit franchising means one franchisee owns and manages several units at the same
time. In the franchising industry, multi-unit franchising is a modal form of growth of
chains. Focusing on a food franchise company in the state of Texas, I use the infor-
mation on the ownership identity of each unit to track how each franchisee grows over
time. By focusing on a particular fast food franchise with no company unit, I study
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the franchisors ownership allocation decisions from 1977 to 2016. Using a multinomial
logit model, I examine how franchisees characteristics affect the franchisors decision.
Most importantly, this paper focuses on the density economies of an owners network.
The main result is that the company prefers medium-sized franchisees with a close
existing unit. Further, I empirically explore two important reasons for franchisors to
use multi-unit franchising, better performance and easier access to capital.
The three chapters of the dissertation have empirically shown that products’ loca-
tions, product locations within the store, and geographic store locations of fast food
chains, matter in the retail food industry. More specifically, the dissertation stud-
ies the value of conveniently located products when there is a vertical layer in the
supply side of the product market. In many industries, products’ locations are the
most important characteristics for consumers. These chapters provide some empirical
evidence that both consumers and firms value products’ locations and contribute to
a better understanding of the retail food industry. In addition, these chapters can
serve as a steppingstone to study further about firms’ strategic decisions in the retail
industry.
Appendix A
Appendix. Figures
Figure A·1: Examples of In-store Promotions : Displays
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Figure A·2: Examples of In-store Promotions : Price Tags
Figure A·3: Examples of In-store Promotions : Store Flyers
Appendix B
Appendix. Tables
Table B.1: Simple Logit Model with Alternative Market Definition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price -1.974∗∗∗ -2.683∗∗∗ -2.709∗∗∗ -0.621∗∗∗ -1.023∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0650) (0.0652) (0.0400) (0.0602)
Display × Price 0.842∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗
(0.0500) (0.0495) (0.0496) (0.0348) (0.0375)
Promotion × Price -0.124∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
(0.0400) (0.0419) (0.0420) (0.0283) (0.0300)
Feature × Price -1.442∗∗∗ -0.716∗∗∗ -0.847∗∗∗ -0.671∗∗∗ -0.150
(0.114) (0.108) (0.108) (0.0756) (0.0797)
Display -1.618∗∗∗ -1.005∗∗∗ -1.141∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.0766) (0.0831)
Promotion 0.668∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗
(0.0943) (0.104) (0.104) (0.0681) (0.0738)
Feature 2.852∗∗∗ 1.401∗∗∗ 1.650∗∗∗ 1.705∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗
(0.232) (0.220) (0.220) (0.155) (0.165)
Number of Soups -0.0606∗∗∗ -0.0491∗∗∗ -0.0427∗∗∗ -0.0688∗∗∗
(0.000213) (0.000254) (0.000453) (0.000689)
Estimated Volume -0.0127∗∗∗
(0.000235)
Average Price 0.885∗∗∗
(0.0548)
Observations 1918228 1918228 1918228 1918228 1918228
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.123 0.124 0.579 0.527
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.2: Linear Probability Regression for Survival
Dep. variable: Survival = 1 if survive for
1 year 2 year 5 year
ln(Size) 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.0577∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(4.60) (8.11) (11.90)
ln(Distance to HQ) -0.00401 -0.00688∗ -0.00918∗
(-1.66) (-2.06) (-2.09)
Constant 0.889∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗
(66.12) (39.91) (17.25)
Observations 4184 4131 3587
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.3: Linear Probability Regression for Survival Controlling for
Innate Quality
Dep. variable: Survival = 1 if survive for
1 year 2 year 5 year
ln(Size) 0.00472 0.0144 0.0211
(0.79) (1.75) (1.83)
ln(Distance to HQ) -0.00421 -0.00746∗ -0.0109∗
(-1.74) (-2.26) (-2.56)
Room to Grow 0.00220∗∗∗ 0.00527∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗
(3.82) (6.68) (10.86)
Years Left -0.00359∗∗∗ -0.00776∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗∗
(-6.05) (-9.41) (-13.11)
Constant 0.965∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗
(53.93) (36.70) (22.75)
Observations 4184 4131 3587
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.4: Probit Regression for Survival
Dep. variable: Survival = 1 if survive for
1 year 2 year 5 year
ln(Size) 0.158∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗
(4.63) (8.14) (11.69)
ln(Distance to HQ) -0.0253 -0.0251∗ -0.0236∗
(-1.69) (-2.04) (-2.05)
Constant 1.208∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗
(14.42) (8.90) (-3.24)
Observations 4184 4131 3587
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.5: Probit Regression for Survival Controlling for Innate Qual-
ity
Dep. variable: Survival = 1 if survive for
1 year 2 year 5 year
ln(Size) 0.0346 0.0586 0.0484
(0.87) (1.75) (1.46)
ln(Distance to HQ) -0.0259 -0.0275∗ -0.0293∗
(-1.72) (-2.20) (-2.49)
Room to Grow 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗
(3.79) (6.65) (10.65)
Years Left -0.0220∗∗∗ -0.0285∗∗∗ -0.0426∗∗∗
(-5.97) (-9.23) (-12.72)
Constant 1.691∗∗∗ 1.258∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗
(14.69) (13.08) (8.21)
Observations 4184 4131 3587
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.6: Multi-unit Franchisees’ Better Access to Capital I with
Alternative MUF Definition
Dep. variable: MUF Ratio
(1) (2)
Urban Ratio 0.290∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(15.97) (10.12)
After 2008 0.114∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗
(6.66) (6.39)
Urban × After 2008 0.155∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗∗
(8.11) (3.93)
ln(Total Population) 0.0385∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗
(23.61) (7.95)
Black Ratio 0.239∗∗∗ 0.0250
(8.44) (0.92)
Constant -0.508∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗
(-22.63) (-4.27)
Observations 20411 20411
MUF Ratio=Total Number of Stores owned by MUF who owns more than 5 unitsTotal Number of Stores
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.7: Multi-unit Franchisees’ Better Access to Capital I with
Alternative MUF Definition
Dep. variable: MUF Ratio
(1) (2)
ln(Housing Value) 0.0449∗∗∗ -0.0373∗
(3.30) (-2.24)
ln(Total Population) 0.0643∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗
(37.08) (7.41)
Urban Ratio 0.461∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(23.87) (10.02)
Black Ratio 0.529∗∗∗ 0.0197
(17.43) (0.71)
Constant -1.382∗∗∗ 0.176
(-8.52) (0.85)
Observations 20298 20298
MUF Ratio=Total Number of Stores owned by MUF who owns more than 5 unitsTotal Number of Stores
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
90
Table B.8: Multi-unit Franchisees’ Better Access to Capital I with
Alternative MUF Definition
Dep. variable: MUF Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Urban Ratio 0.461∗∗∗ 1.761∗∗ -1.064∗
(23.87) (3.11) (-2.12)
ln(Housing Value) 0.0449∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗ -0.137∗∗
(3.30) (3.16) (-3.14)
ln(Total Population) 0.0643∗∗∗ 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗
(37.08) (36.65) (7.54)
Black Ratio 0.529∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.0214
(17.43) (17.30) (0.77)
Urban × ln(Housing Value) -0.111∗ 0.105∗
(-2.30) (2.47)
Constant -1.382∗∗∗ -2.577∗∗∗ 1.343∗∗
(-8.52) (-4.73) (2.61)
Observations 20298 20298 20298
MUF Ratio=Total Number of Stores owned by MUF who owns more than 5 unitsTotal Number of Stores
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.9: Multi-unit Franchisees’ Better Access to Capital I with
Alternative MUF Definition
Dep. variable: MUF Ratio
(1) (2)
Urban Ratio 0.0166 0.000509
(1.83) (0.06)
After 2008 0.00617 0.0515
(0.72) (1.64)
Urban × After 2008 0.112∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(11.77) (11.07)
ln(Total Population) 0.00597∗∗∗ 0.00361∗∗∗
(7.34) (4.20)
Black Ratio 0.0177 -0.00781
(1.25) (-0.55)
Constant -0.0648∗∗∗ -0.0378
(-5.79) (-1.19)
Observations 20411 20411
MUF Ratio=Total Number of Stores owned by MUF who owns more than 20 unitsTotal Number of Stores
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.10: Multi-unit Franchisees’ Better Access to Capital I with
Alternative MUF Definition
Dep. variable: MUF Ratio
(1) (2)
ln(Housing Value) 0.0602∗∗∗ -0.000994
(9.07) (-0.11)
ln(Total Population) 0.0181∗∗∗ 0.00385∗∗∗
(21.38) (4.36)
Urban Ratio 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.000622
(9.37) (0.07)
Black Ratio 0.153∗∗∗ -0.000676
(10.34) (-0.05)
Constant -0.922∗∗∗ -0.0324
(-11.64) (-0.30)
Observations 20298 20298
MUF Ratio=Total Number of Stores owned by MUF who owns more than 20 unitsTotal Number of Stores
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
92
Table B.11: Multi-unit Franchisees’ Better Access to Capital I with
Alternative MUF Definition
Dep. variable: MUF Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Urban Ratio 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.679∗ -0.209
(9.37) (2.46) (-0.80)
ln(Housing Value) 0.0602∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ -0.0179
(9.07) (4.70) (-0.78)
ln(Total Population) 0.0181∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.00389∗∗∗
(21.38) (21.04) (4.40)
Black Ratio 0.153∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ -0.000382
(10.34) (10.22) (-0.03)
Urban × ln(Housing Value) -0.0502∗ 0.0178
(-2.14) (0.80)
Constant -0.922∗∗∗ -1.465∗∗∗ 0.165
(-11.64) (-5.51) (0.61)
Observations 20298 20298 20298
MUF Ratio=Total Number of Stores owned by MUF who owns more than 20 unitsTotal Number of Stores
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.12: Multi-unit Franchisees’ Better Access to Capital I
(1) (2)
Relative Growth of MUF
Urban Ratio 0.871∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗
(6.07) (2.99)
After 2008 -0.0480 1.992∗∗∗
(-0.42) (5.69)
Urban × After 2008 1.107∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗
(7.63) (6.17)
ln(Total Population) 0.148∗∗∗ 0.0392∗
(9.34) (2.33)
Black Ratio 0.618∗ -0.201
(2.32) (-0.76)
Constant -2.344∗∗∗ -2.415∗∗∗
(-12.33) (-6.59)
Observations 7340 7340
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.13: Multi-unit Franchisees’ Better Access to Capital II
(1) (2)
Relative Growth of MUF
ln(Housing Value) -0.267 0.00141
(-1.69) (0.01)
ln(Total Population) 0.235∗∗∗ 0.0490∗∗
(14.60) (2.87)
Urban Ratio 1.527∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗
(10.63) (3.53)
Black Ratio 1.555∗∗∗ -0.0410
(5.74) (-0.15)
Constant -0.449 -2.633
(-0.24) (-0.92)
Observations 7280 7280
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.14: Multi-unit Franchisees’ Better Access to Capital III
(1) (2) (3)
Relative Growth of MUF
Urban Ratio 1.527∗∗∗ 4.570 -10.96∗∗
(10.63) (1.07) (-2.64)
ln(Housing Value) -0.267 -0.0580 -0.769∗
(-1.69) (-0.17) (-2.09)
ln(Total Population) 0.235∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.0557∗∗
(14.60) (14.09) (3.24)
Black Ratio 1.555∗∗∗ 1.532∗∗∗ 0.0232
(5.74) (5.61) (0.09)
Urban × ln(Housing Value) -0.260 0.976∗∗
(-0.71) (2.77)
Constant -0.449 -2.862 6.284
(-0.24) (-0.74) (1.46)
Observations 7280 7280 7280
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
References
Ackerberg, D. A. (2001). Empirically distinguishing informative and prestige effects
of advertising. The RAND Journal of Economics, 32(2):316–333.
Ackerberg, D. A. and Rysman, M. (2005). Unobserved product differentiation in
discrete-choice models: estimating price elasticities and welfare effects. The RAND
Journal of Economics, 36(4):771–788.
Ackermann, J. (2016). The effect of franchising on store performance: evidence from
an ownership change. Working Paper.
Asker, J. (2016). Diagnosing foreclosure due to exclusive dealing. The Journal of
Industrial Economics, 64(3):375–410.
Bates, T. (1998). Survival patterns among newcomers to franchising. Journal of
Business Venturing, 13(2):113–130.
Becker, G. S. and Murphy, K. M. (1993). A simple theory of advertising as a good
or bad. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(4):941–964.
Berry, S., Levinsohn, J., and Pakes, A. (1995). Automobile prices in market equilib-
rium. Econometrica, 63(4):841–890.
Berry, S. T. (1994). Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation.
The RAND Journal of Economics, 25(2):242–262.
Berto Villas-Boas, S. (2007). Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retail-
ers: Inference with limited data. The Review of Economic Studies, 74(2):625–652.
Blair, R. D., Lafontaine, F., et al. (2005). The economics of franchising. Cambridge
University Press.
Bonnet, C. and Dubois, P. (2010). Inference on vertical contracts between manu-
facturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance.
The RAND Journal of Economics, 41(1):139–164.
Bradach, J. L. (1998). Franchise organizations. Harvard Business Press.
Bronnenberg, B. J., Dhar, S. K., and Dube´, J.-P. H. (2011). Endogenous sunk
costs and the geographic differences in the market structures of cpg categories.
Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 9(1):1–23.
94
95
Bronnenberg, B. J., Kruger, M. W., and Mela, C. F. (2008). Database paper - the
iri marketing data set. Marketing science, 27(4):745–748.
Chan, T. Y., Narasimhan, C., and Yoon, Y. (2017). Advertising and price com-
petition in a manufacturer-retailer channel. International Journal of Research in
Marketing, 34(3):694–716.
Chevalier, J. A., Kashyap, A. K., and Rossi, P. E. (2003). Why don’t prices rise
during periods of peak demand? evidence from scanner data. American Economic
Review, 93(1):15–37.
Disney, R. and Gathergood, J. (2009). Housing wealth, liquidity constraints and
self-employment. Labour Economics, 16(1):79–88.
Erdem, T., Keane, M. P., and Sun, B. (2008). The impact of advertising on con-
sumer price sensitivity in experience goods markets. Quantitative Marketing and
Economics, 6(2):139–176.
Fan, Y., Ku¨hn, K.-U., and Lafontaine, F. (2017). Financial constraints and moral
hazard: The case of franchising. Journal of Political Economy, 125(6):2082–2125.
Gentry, M. L. (2016). Displays, sales, and in-store search in retail markets. Working
Paper.
Go´mez, R. S., Gonza´lez, I. S., and Va´zquez, L. (2010). Multi-unit versus single-
unit franchising: assessing why franchisors use different ownership strategies. The
Service Industries Journal, 30(3):463–476.
Gru¨nhagen, M. and Mittelstaedt, R. A. (2005). Entrepreneurs or investors: do
multi-unit franchisees have different philosophical orientations? Journal of Small
Business Management, 43(3):207–225.
Gupta, S. (1988). Impact of sales promotions on when, what, and how much to buy.
Journal of Marketing research, 25(4):342–355.
Hendel, I. and Nevo, A. (2006). Measuring the implications of sales and consumer
inventory behavior. Econometrica, 74(6):1637–1673.
Ho, K. (2009). Insurer-provider networks in the medical care market. American
Economic Review, 99(1):393–430.
Hristakeva, S. (2018). Vertical contracts with endogenous product selections: an
empirical analysis of vendor allowance contracts. Working Paper.
Israilevich, G. (2004). Assessing supermarket product-line decisions: the impact of
slotting fees. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 2(2):141–167.
96
Ji, M. and Weil, D. (2015). The impact of franchising on labor standards compliance.
ILR Review, 68(5):977–1006.
Kalnins, A. and Lafontaine, F. (2004). Multi-unit ownership in franchising: evidence
from the fast-food industry in texas. The RAND Journal of Economics, 35(4):747–
761.
Kalnins, A. and Lafontaine, F. (2013). Too far away? the effect of distance to head-
quarters on business establishment performance. American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics, 5(3):157–79.
Kaufmann, P. J. and Dant, R. P. (1996). Multi-unit franchising: Growth and man-
agement issues. Journal of Business Venturing, 11(5):343–358.
Klein, B. and Wright, J. D. (2007). The economics of slotting contracts. The Journal
of Law and Economics, 50(3):421–454.
Lafontaine, F. et al. (1992). Agency theory and franchising: some empirical results.
The RAND journal of Economics, 23(2):263–283.
Lafontaine, F. and Shaw, K. (2016). Serial entrepreneurship: Learning by doing?
Journal of Labor Economics, 34(S2):S217–S254.
Lafontaine, F., Zapletal, M., and Zhang, X. (2019). Brighter prospects? assessing
the franchise advantage using census data. Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy, 28(2):175–197.
Lazear, E. P. (2005). Entrepreneurship. Journal of Labor Economics, 23(4):649–680.
Lemon, K. N. and Nowlis, S. M. (2002). Developing synergies between promo-
tions and brands in different price–quality tiers. Journal of Marketing Research,
39(2):171–185.
Martin, R. E. (1988). Franchising and risk management. American Economic
Review, 78(5):954–968.
Marx, L. M. and Shaffer, G. (2010). Slotting allowances and scarce shelf space.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 19(3):575–603.
Mortimer, J. H. (2008). Vertical contracts in the video rental industry. The Review
of Economic Studies, 75(1):165–199.
Nevo, A. (2001). Measuring market power in the ready-to-eat cereal industry. Econo-
metrica, 69(2):307–342.
Papatla, P. and Krishnamurthi, L. (1996). Measuring the dynamic effects of promo-
tions on brand choice. Journal of Marketing Research, 33(1):20–35.
97
Pires, T. (2016). Costly search and consideration sets in storable goods markets.
Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 14(3):157–193.
Schmalz, M. C., Sraer, D. A., and Thesmar, D. (2017). Housing collateral and
entrepreneurship. The Journal of Finance, 72(1):99–132.
Seiler, S. (2013). The impact of search costs on consumer behavior: A dynamic
approach. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 11(2):155–203.
Sudhir, K. (2001). Structural analysis of manufacturer pricing in the presence of a
strategic retailer. Marketing Science, 20(3):244–264.
Sutton, J. (1991). Sunk costs and market structure: Price competition, advertising,
and the evolution of concentration. MIT press.
Tenn, S. (2006). Avoiding aggregation bias in demand estimation: A multivariate
promotional disaggregation approach. Quantitative Marketing and Economics,
4(4):383–405.
Tenn, S., Froeb, L., and Tschantz, S. (2010). Mergers when firms compete by choos-
ing both price and promotion. International Journal of Industrial Organization,
28(6):695–707.
Villas-Boas, J. M. and Zhao, Y. (2005). Retailer, manufacturers, and individual
consumers: Modeling the supply side in the ketchup marketplace. Journal of
Marketing Research, 42(1):83–95.
CURRICULUM VITAE
99
